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Sullivan: Harris v. Quinn and Freedom of Association: Why Congress Needs to

HARRIS V. QUINN AND FREEDOM OF
ASSOCIATION: WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO
STEP IN TO EXPAND THE RULING
I. INTRODUCTION
Tim works for a public organization. 1 One day in July, Tim and his
coworkers held a meeting to discuss a proposed change—the
establishment of union representation. Many of the employees looked
around in confusion and wondered about the pros and cons of union
representation. After further discussion, a vote was held with the majority
of people voting for union representation. Tim was upset because he
voted against union representation and, as a result of the vote, would have
to pay an unwanted union fee.
Weeks later, Tim received a letter informing him that all employees
will be represented by a union within his industry for contract
administration, grievance adjustment, and collective bargaining issues. In
addition, the letter stated that while dues will be enforced, the amount
would be disclosed at a later time. Several months later, Tim received a
letter in the mail detailing the allocation of costs for joining the union. He
believes that payment of compelled membership dues for the union
violates his First Amendment right of freedom of association for being
forced to support an organization in opposition of his own views.
Currently, if Tim wants to opt out of paying the fee, the public union
has the right to terminate his employment. As a result, if Tim wants a job
in the public sector, he must support an organization that may have
opposing views to his own. The principle of compelling public workers
to pay a non-membership fee (“agency fee”) towards the representative
union has been recognized and followed since the 1977 case Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education.2 At the time, the primary purpose of the agency
fee was to solve the free rider issue—public employees receiving union
benefits for free.3 Over the past forty years, the concept of unions
compelling agency fees to non-members created a divide between public
employees and unions.4

This scenario is fictional and solely the work of the author.
See 431 U.S. 209, 241 (1977) (discussing the significant burden on the employees for
compelling dues).
3
See id. at 221–22 (“A union-shop arrangement . . . counteracts the incentive that
employees might otherwise have to become ‘free riders’—to refuse to contribute to the union
while obtaining benefits of union representation.”).
4
See id. at 222 (discussing the impact on First Amendment rights and the need to protect
the unions).
1
2

573

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 7

574

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

In the summer of 2014, Harris v. Quinn changed the long-established
principle, but did not overrule Abood.5 Harris bridged the gap between the
union’s ability to compel an agency fee and the right of public employees
to freely associate with any organization they wish to support. 6
Specifically, Harris dealt with quasi-public employees and gave them the
right to opt out of the compelled agency fee. 7 The Supreme Court held
that personal assistants, acting as quasi-public employees, can opt out of
paying agency fees to support unions, but left open the question of
whether all public employees will be able to opt out of agency fees to
protect their freedom of association. 8
The First Amendment right of freedom of association protects
employees’ rights in the public workforce. 9 In order for unions to co-exist
with employees in the public sector, the courts must ignore the Abood
standard of permitting agency fees against non-members of the union for
grievance-adjustment, collective bargaining, and contract administration
purposes.10 The Abood standard is flawed because it incorrectly applied
two cases in its analysis regarding the constitutionality of compulsory
payments, which makes the re-evaluation of the issue necessary to protect
the freedom of association for all public employees. 11
Part II of this Note discusses the history and development of the
freedom of association in the U.S. workforce. 12 Then, Part III analyzes
freedom of association in the context of Harris v. Quinn and suggests using
the misinterpretation of the two cases used in the analysis to replace the
Abood standard.13 Next, Part IV proposes establishing a new standard
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (stating that the judgment of the Court
of Appeals is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings).
6
See id. (acknowledging that collecting an agency fee is prohibited by the First
Amendment from employees that do not want to support or join the union).
7
See id. (“[N]o person in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third
party that he or she does not wish to support.”).
8
See id. (holding that the personal assistants who work in the Rehabilitation Program
that do not want to support a union cannot be compelled to subsidize their speech by a third
party).
9
See id. at 2628 (establishing that the freedom of association was thought to be protected
by the Bill of Rights).
10
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 232 (1977) (explaining that the Michigan
Court of Appeals was correct in its decision to enforce the service charges for non-members
applied for collective bargaining, grievance adjustment, and contract administration
purposes).
11
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (“The Abood Court seriously erred in treating [Railway
Employees Department v.] Hanson and [International Association of Machinists v.] Street as having
all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a public-sector union.”).
12
See infra Part II (discussing the historical development of freedom of association in the
workforce).
13
See infra Part III (analyzing the reasons why the freedom of association is important and
should cover all public employees).
5
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through amending the Employees’ Rights statute that will compensate for
the inconsistencies in court cases dealing with agency fees and public
employees.14 Finally, Part V concludes how the new standard will
improve the public-sector’s working conditions.15
II. BACKGROUND
Ever since the inception of the agency shop provision, the freedom of
association issues surrounding the union’s ability to compel an agency fee
from non-members became more problematic over time.16 In Harris, the
Supreme Court raised serious doubts about the future of agency fees for
public employees by giving personal assistants the ability to receive union
benefits by opting out of the agency fee payments.17 These serious doubts
require immediate action that should result in amending the Employees’
Rights statute to give all public employees the right to opt out of agency
fees.18
Part II.A discusses the historical development of unions, including the
original purpose for forming unions and the Acts that gave the unions
power.19 Next, Part II.B discusses the cases leading up to Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, including Railway Employees Department v. Hanson and
International Association of Machinists v. Street.20 Then, Part II.C discusses
the significance of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, including the factual
scenario of the case, the purpose behind exclusive representation of
employees, and how the Court addressed the free rider issue. 21 Then, Part
II.D discusses Harris v. Quinn and the evolution of right to work laws in

See infra Part IV (establishing a new standard through a modified statute that all public
employees will be given the opportunity to opt out of agency fees).
15
See infra Part V (concluding that the proposed statute is the best solution to protect the
freedom of association for public employees).
16
See infra Part II.A (reviewing the formation and historical significance of unions,
including creating cohesion in the workplace, preventing free riders from using the services
without payment, and relieving the financial burden for employees of bringing claims
against the employer).
17
See infra Part II.D (refusing to extend the standard in Abood to the quasi-public
employees in Harris because of the flawed analysis in relying on previous cases).
18
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the Employees’ Rights statute by giving
all public employees the right to refuse agency fees).
19
See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of Abood through the detailed factual scenario,
along with the reasoning behind the decisions made throughout the case).
20
See infra Part II.B (reviewing the holding and significance of two important cases relied
upon in Abood, and the evolution of the agency fee system).
21
See infra Part II.C (examining the holding and reasoning of Abood).
14
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the Judicial System.22 Finally, Part II.E discusses the fundamentals of the
First Amendment, including an overview of freedom of association. 23
A. Historical Development of Unions
State and federal legislation govern the right of public sector
employees to organize unions whereas the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”) only governs the private sector.24 In 1902, executive orders
banned federal employees from petitioning for salary increases in
Congress because President Roosevelt intended to decrease congressional
oversight of federal departments and restrict the growing political power
of civil servant special interest groups.25 In 1912, the Taft administration
lifted the ban and advocated for the right of employees to petition
Congress for better working conditions. 26
See infra Part II.D (explaining the factual scenario, holding, and reasoning in Harris v.
Quinn).
23
See infra Part II.E (analyzing the freedom of association as inherently incorporating the
freedom to associate from organizations, including unions).
24
See Catherine Phillips, The Lost Democratic Institution of Petitioning: Public Employee
Collective Bargaining as a Constitutional Right, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 652, 656 (2012)
(describing the constitutional framework for public employees as unique compared to other
citizens). During 2010, 6.9% of workers in the private-sector were union members, unlike the
public sector that had forty percent of workers belonging to unions. Id. at 657. During 2011,
thirteen states limited or eliminated public-sector bargaining rights. See Joseph Slater, The
Strangely Unsettled State of Public-Sector Labor in the Past Thirty Years, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 511, 532 (2013) (listing the states that limited the bargaining rights in some way as being
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Ohio, Oklahoma, Tennessee, and Wisconsin).
25
See Phillips, supra note 24, at 657 (considering the ban as the beginning of the publicsector movement that incurred more problems in organizing the public workforce than the
private-sector). The executive order broadened the ban on petitioning for improved
conditions and terms in Congress. See William Herbert, Public Sector Labor Law and History:
The Politics of Ancient History?, 28 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 335, 348 (2011) (discussing the
history behind the effort to curtail the right of public employees to seek improvements of
working conditions). The following language applied to all federal employees:
All officers and employees of the United States of every description
serving in or under any of the Executive Departments and whether so
serving in or out of Washington are hereby forbidden either direct or
indirect, individually or through associations, to solicit an increase of
pay, or to influence or to attempt to influence in their own interest any
legislation whatever, either before Congress or its Committees, or in any
way save through the heads of the Departments in or under which they
serve, on penalty of dismissal from the government service.
Id.
26
See Phillips, supra note 24, at 657 (explaining the ban as being lifted by the LloydLaFollette Act of 1912). Additionally, the administration attempted to limit the interactions
between legislative bodies and public employees on the state level. Id. Even though the ban
was lifted, various lobbying efforts attempted to ban unions in the public sector outside the
federal government. See Herbert, supra note 25, at 349 (distinguishing that lobbying for
22
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After 1912, the public sector was still having issues organizing unions,
but private sector unions received statutory protections with the passing
of the NLRA in 1935.27 Two years later, skepticism continued to exist
concerning public workers pursuing collective bargaining or unionization
because of the nature of the industry.28 The subsequent court decisions
displayed antagonism towards unions and produced greater skepticism
until the 1960s.29
In 1962, President Kennedy gave federal public employees limited
collective bargaining rights and established union recognition procedures
through Executive Order 10988.30
The states used the federal
legislative action to improve working conditions appears at both the state and federal levels).
In addition to petitioning Congress, the lifted ban also permitted employees to furnish
information to the House of Representatives or the Senate. Id. at 349.
27
See National Labor Relations Act, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449, 449–551 (1935)
(diminishing labor disputes and creating the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”)); see
also Phillips, supra note 24, at 657–58 (detailing the benefits of the Act as permitting workers
to petition, organize, boycott, strike, and collectively bargain). The Act provided the privatesector statutory protection by assuring the right to organize through unions, to bargain
collectively through the employers, and to protect other activity related to the collective
bargaining process. See Henry H. Drummonds, Reforming Labor Law by Reforming Labor Law
Preemption Doctrine to Allow the States to Make More Labor Relations Policy, 70 LA. L. REV. 97,
114 (2009) (exploring the evidence pointing to the NLRA as promising more than what it can
fulfill). One of the downsides of the NLRA is that threats fall outside of it. Id.
28
See Phillips, supra note 24, at 658 (explaining that Franklin Roosevelt believed that
collective bargaining could not fit within the public sector). President Roosevelt reasoned:
The very nature and purposes of government make it impossible for
administrative officials to represent fully or to bind the employer in
mutual discussions with government employee organizations. The
employer is the whole people, who speak by . . . laws enacted by their
representatives in Congress. Accordingly, administrative officials and
employers alike are governed and guided, and in many cases restricted,
by laws which establish policies, procedure or rules in personnel
matters.
Id.
29
See id. at 659 (describing the Court’s holding as giving public employees no right to
bargain, strike, or arbitrate disputes). In this time period, employees could be fired for
conducting activity that resembled union organization. Id. Between the 1930s and 1940s,
memberships within unions tripled, and around twenty-five percent of the workforce
unionized. See Marisa Benson & Tiffany Nichols, Labor Organizations and Labor Relations HB
361, 30 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 191, 191–92 (2013) (analyzing the history of union memberships and
the related bills that restricted its growth). Following the growth of union memberships,
Congress introduced 250 bills related to unions in 1947. Id. at 192.
30
See Deborah Prokopf, Public Employees at the School of Hard Knox: How the Supreme Court
Is Turning Public-Sector Unions into a History Lesson, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1363, 1366
(2013) (stating that Executive Order 10988 was considered the Magna Carta for unionism
with federal-employees). Even though the discussion on collective bargaining began with
Executive Order 10988, organized labor activity occurred as early as the 1830s. See Kenneth
Bullock, Official Time as Form of Union Security in Federal Sector Labor-Management Relations,
59 A.F.L. REV. 153, 164 (2007) (introducing the first organized labor activity occurring in

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 7

578

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

government’s authority to establish and pass legislation that granted
public employees at the local and state level the authority to bargain with
unions.31 As a result, union memberships for public employees increased
500% between 1956 and 1978.32 As public-sector unions grew, the privatesector unionization rates declined. 33 Currently, the laws have adapted to
meet the demand of public-sector unions.34 Part II.A.1 explains the current
status of the law for unions, including collective bargaining on behalf of
public employees, exclusivity of the union-employee relationship, and

Navy yards to obtain ten-hour workdays without reducing the employee’s pay). Between
the 1860s and 1880s, the prevailing rate wages were recognized by Congress and eight-hour
days were implemented. Id. at 164–65.
31
See Prokopf, supra note 30, at 1366 (recognizing that the states modeled their legislation
after the federal government). Following the federal government’s first step toward
unionism accelerated the enactment of state legislation. Id. Up to the 1980s, forty-two states
enacted collective bargaining for public employees. Id. In 1959, Wisconsin passed the first
state public sector labor law, but lacked a foundation for granting public sector unions rights.
See Joseph E. Slater, The Assault on Public Sector Collective Bargaining: Real Harms and
Imaginary Benefits, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2011), https://www.acslaw.org/
sites/default/files/Slater_Collective_Bargaining.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FRF9-FP4S]
(establishing the struggle with being the first state to establish the public sector labor law).
The Wisconsin law focused on barring strikes through the use of fact-finding, mediation, and
binding interest arbitration. Id.
32
See Prokopf, supra note 30, at 1366 (analyzing the growth of unions within the public
sector as growing exponentially between the periods of 1960 to 1978). By 1978, unions
represented about forty percent of all public employees. Id. During the 1970s, unions
appeared to be well-established in the labor markets. See John Pencavel, The Changing Size
Distribution of U.S. Trade Unions and Its Description by Pareto’s Distribution, 67 INDST. & LAB.
RELS. REV. 138, 140 (2014) (recognizing the fluctuation in union memberships between the
years 1974 to 2007). Around 20 million employees were members of unions, and 8000 union
elections occurred each year. Id. In 1974, the only union that had substantial representation
among employees was the National Education Association. Id. However, most unions were
not subject to collective bargaining contracts. Id. at 141.
33
See Prokopf, supra note 30, at 1366–67 (stating while peak union membership was at
34.8% in 1954, the overall union membership in 2012 was at 11.3%, and the union
membership in the private sector was at 6.6% and 35.9% in the public sector). The decline in
national private sector unionization is attributable to the NLRB interpreting the NLRA in
less favorable ways towards collective bargaining and unionization. See Ann C. Hodges,
Lessons from the Laboratory: The Polar Opposites on the Public Sector Labor Law Spectrum, 18
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 735, 743 (2009) (comparing the unionization rates among Illinois
and Virginia). The public-sector unionization rates also depend upon the state law, which
may be more hostile towards collective bargaining. Id.
34
See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the status of current laws in regards to union
membership). In 2013, twenty-two states provided arbitration as a resolution procedure for
the public employees. See Harry C. Katz, Is U.S. Public Sector Labor Relations in the Midst of a
Transformation?, 66 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1031, 1035 (2013) (distinguishing the state laws
as only covering firefighters and police, rather than all state employees). The threat of
arbitration alone is enough to reach a negotiation within the collective bargaining process.
Id.
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closed-shop agreements.35 Then, Part II.A.2 discusses the Taft-Hartley
Act, including the purpose and importance of the Act. 36
1.

Current Status of the Law

Under current state and federal law, when a union is selected by a
majority of the employees, it will represent all the employees within the
bargaining unit for collective bargaining purposes.37
Collective
bargaining is the process where unions negotiate the terms of the
employees’ contracts with the employers.38 Employers prefer the
exclusivity of the union because the employer can address one group’s
stance rather than multiple stances.39 The use of a single representative
promotes a state of cohesion among employees and avoids inter-union
rivalries.40
See infra Part II.A.1 (examining the current status of law dealing with unions).
See infra Part II.A.2 (detailing reasons why Section 14(b) was enacted along with the
benefits of the Act).
37
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (“Representatives designated or selected for the purposes
of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit . . . shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
[for] . . . pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.”); see also
Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62 (1975) (establishing that
as long as the majority of employees select union representation, the NLRA permits unions
to bargain with employers to make the union membership a condition of employment).
38
See
Collective
Bargaining
Fact
Sheet,
AFL-CIO
AMERICA’S
UNIONS,
http://www.aflcio.org/Learn-About-Unions/Collective-Bargaining/Collective-Bargaining
-Fact-Sheet [http://perma.cc/Q2Y3-RWPE] (describing the terms included in employment
contracts during collective bargaining as hours, pay, pensions, benefits, health care, leave,
safety policies, and more). The employees, as a collective unit, decide the priorities for
bargaining with the employers. Id. The union employees will choose the representative that
will speak on their behalves for bargaining sessions, with the end result being a contract
between the employer and employees. Id. Each year, around 30,000 collective bargaining
agreements are formed, representing around eight million private employees and 8.5 million
public employees. Id.
39
See Emporium Capwell Co., 420 U.S. at 62 (examining the benefits of having a union). The
problem with this system is that total satisfaction for all is difficult to achieve for those who
are represented by a union. Id. The use of a single union helps further the goal of promoting
peace among the workforce by subordinating the individual interests for the collective
interests of every employee within the bargaining unit. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182
(1967) (reviewing the reasons for a collective bargaining system).
The exclusive
representative also solves the issue of impartial review through discriminatory or arbitrary
union conduct. Id.
40
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220–21 (1977) (discussing the advantages
that an exclusive union brings, rather than having multiple employee groups demanding
different variant conditions and terms of employment). Congress designed exclusive
representation to strengthen the overall union power and decrease the monopoly power of
the employer within its own organization. See David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law
Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Professional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689, 693 (1990)
(providing the basic description behind the necessity of exclusive representation). Exclusive
35
36
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Even though the union represents all of the employees, employees are
not required to join.41 The exclusivity portion requires that only the union
represent every employee for collective bargaining issues, regardless of
whether every employee voted for it. 42 Unions do not have to address
every claim, but must utilize the duty of fair representation without any
sort of discrimination or bad faith.43 Whether or not the employees are
members, they still receive the union benefits, ranging from enforcement
of contractual rights to free legal representation in arbitrations. 44
There are several and often opposing opinions concerning the
decision to create a union because the unions represent such a large
amount of employees.45 For instance, the competing interests of
representation also prohibits employers from dealings between non-union employees and
individuals. Id. Without the designation of exclusive representation, unions would lose their
power to bargain efficiently and effectively by having to compete against other individuals
or unions. Id.
41
See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (detailing the right of employees to join or refrain from joining
a union); Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After
Knox v. SEIU, Local 1000, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2013) (identifying that represented
employees are bound by the union’s negotiating decisions even if the employees do not join
the union).
42
See 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (2012) (acknowledging the union’s duty to be the exclusive
representative of the organization). The collective bargaining issues encompass hours of
employment, rates of pay, wages, and other employment conditions. Id. Furthermore, the
employees have the right to present any grievances to the employer and have the grievances
adjusted unless the adjustment is inconsistent with the collective bargaining terms in the
contract. Id.; see also 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 270 (2009) (recognizing that
the needs of the larger work force are balanced with the economic interests of employees to
negotiate collective bargaining agreements).
43
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)–(3) (2012) (implementing the requirement that labor
organizations use a duty of fair representation with no discrimination). The labor
organization cannot cause an employer to discriminate against an employee for a denied
membership resulting from reasons other than non-payment of dues. Id. § 158(b)(2). In
addition, the union is obligated to confer in good faith in determining hours, wages, and
other conditions of employment. Id. § 158(d); see Pyett, 556 U.S. at 271 (finding that if the
union’s conduct involves bad faith, discrimination, or arbitrariness, then the union breached
the duty of fair representation).
44
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(2) (confirming that the labor organization cannot terminate
benefits to non-members); see also Pyett, 556 U.S. at 271 (holding that unions have a duty to
represent employees in negotiation activities); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 (1967) (stating
that unions have a duty to represent employees to enforce contractual rights). The benefit
shared by non-members do not include ideological or political benefits provided by unions.
See Harry G. Hutchison, Reclaiming the Labor Movement Through Union Dues? A Postmodern
Perspective in the Mirror of Public Choice Theory, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 447, 486 (2000)
(showing that there should be some benefits that only members can receive for paying the
extra premium for full access to all the benefits).
45
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1030 (identifying that every decision the union
makes will not be supported by every employee). Opposing opinions are the direct result of
differences between members and non-members of unions. See Daniel A. Himebaugh, Note,
Consider the Source: A Note on Public-Sector Union Expenditure Restrictions Upheld in Davenport

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss2/7

Sullivan: Harris v. Quinn and Freedom of Association: Why Congress Needs to

2016]

Harris v. Quinn and Freedom of Association

581

increasing health benefits at the cost of decreasing wages, to giving
promotions based on quality of work rather than seniority, will disappoint
some employees that have opposing viewpoints. 46 However, differences
in employee opinions over the negotiation terms do not make the terms
invalid.47 To counter the differences, the law requires unions to represent
the employees fairly.48
Some industries require closed-shop agreements, which force
employees to be members of a union as a condition of employment. 49 To
prevent free riders from gaining from the system, union activists
determined that all employees must pay to retain benefits produced by
v. Washington Education Association, 28 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 533, 536 (2008)
(providing that non-members are compelled to pay agency fees because of the inability to
become a member and adopt the union’s viewpoints). Abood established the ability for
employees to object to the ideological viewpoints of unions. Id. at 536–37.
46
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1030–31 (weighing the different scenarios that
may disappoint employees). Unions have to make trade-offs that will negatively affect some
employees. Id. at 1031. The purpose is for the union to make sacrifices to further the
efficiency of production for employment security. See Matthew Dimick, Compensation,
Employment Security, and the Economics of Public-Sector Labor Law, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 533, 542
(2012) (admitting that risk-averse employees will choose work security over higher wages).
The risk-neutral employees provide a different prospective by preferring the competitive
market to determine the level of employment protection, thus maximizing the level of the
firm’s productivity. Id. at 543. The political power of public-sector unions could increase
both employment security and wages, but this comes at a cost of waiving freedom of
association in the workforce. Id. at 547.
47
See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (elaborating that bargaining
representatives who serve employees must exercise honesty and good faith in using
reasonable discretion). The employees have the option of being members or non-members
of a union, but the union continues to have exclusive representation over all employees. Id.
Differences arise within the terms of the negotiated agreement that affect individual and
classes of employees. Id. Employers and unions alike do not expect complete satisfaction
among every employee. Id. For these reasons, the statutory authority governing unions
provides for reasonableness in serving employees. Id.
48
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (2012) (discussing the duty of fair representation required for
unions as exclusive representatives of an industry); see also Steele v. Louisville & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 203 (1944) (recognizing a duty imposed on unions to exercise their power
fairly among employees, without hostile discrimination); Martin H. Malin, The Supreme Court
and the Duty of Fair Representation, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 127, 127 (1992) (finding the
primary legal duty to hold unions accountable to employees is authorized by the duty of fair
representation). But see Michael J. Goldberg, The Duty of Fair Representation: What the Courts
Do in Fact, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 89, 96 (1985) (concluding that the duty of fair representation fails
to protect employees from discriminatory, arbitrary, or perfunctory union conduct).
49
See Alvaro Santos, Three Transnational Discourses of Labor Law in Domestic Reforms, 32 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 123, 142–43 (2010) (explaining that employers could require financial
contributions and union membership to be an employee of that organization). Since the
formation of the closed-shop agreements, judicial and legislative action eroded all forms of
security agreements. Id. The Taft-Hartley Act later prohibited the closed-shop agreement.
Id. at 143. The Supreme Court holding analyzed the prohibition, stating that unions can only
use non-member fees for collective bargaining purposes. Id.
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unions, resulting in non-members still having to pay fees.50 Unions
utilized monopolized power over employee interests to ensure high
professional standards.51
Some unions strongly believe in the
monopolized power and require employees to be members of the union
that are represented in a particular industry. 52 The Wagner Act originally
permitted these closed-shop agreements, requiring union membership for
employment purposes.53 The liberty of a party to enter into union
contracts is impinged because the arrangements of the constitutional
constraints stretch beyond a reasonable interpretation of the freedom of
association.54
See Malin, supra note 48, at 146 (stating that the fees were necessary for the unions to
exclusively represent the employees, as long as the fees do not significantly place any burden
on free speech). Abood established that non-members of a union can be required to pay a fee
for the costs of collective bargaining. See Fisk & Chemerinksy, supra note 41, at 1053
(acknowledging that unions could require non-members of a union to pay for collective
bargaining activities, but not for ideological purposes). Furthermore, the Court said that the
bar could compel similar fees for use of disciplining members or proposing ethical codes. Id.
51
See Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Button, 371 US. 415, 438–40 (1963)
(highlighting the State’s argument to control the employees’ exclusive representation in
order to protect personal liberty interests). The union restrictions over its employees
functions as a monopolized power. See Matthew T. Bodie, Information and the Market for
Union Representation, 94 VA. L. REV. 1, 56 (2008) (acknowledging that the restrictions that
provide unions the ability for exclusive representation ultimately create a monopolized
power for unions over the employees). Unlike most monopolies, nonprofit labor unions are
exempt from antitrust laws and regulations. Id.
52
See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Union Security Agreements Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Statute, the Constitution, and the Court’s Opinion in Beck, 27 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 51, 57–61 (1990) (discussing the ramifications of requiring employment based on union
membership). This reasoning goes directly towards the necessity of limitations on union
competition. See Bodie, supra note 51, at 56 (examining the reasoning behind limiting union
competition). Competition between unions wastes union resources. Id. In addition, when
the union represents a large percentage of the employees within an industry, unions can use
the collective worker power more effectively. Id.
53
See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2012) (stating that nothing in the statute can preclude an
employer from negotiating with a labor organization and conditioning employment based
on membership); JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 28 (H. Victoria Hedian
et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012) (describing the proposed legislation of the Wagner Act). The Wagner
Act gave employees the legally enforceable right to organize. HIGGINS, JR., supra note 53, at
28. New requirements were implemented that forced employers to utilize representatives
selected by the employees for purposes of collective bargaining between employers and
employees. Id. The Wagner Act permitted employees to engage in strikes to balance the
bargaining power between employees and employers. Id. The Wagner Act implemented
the NLRB to enforce substantive rights and protect employees from unfair labor practices.
Id. at 29.
54
See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 52, at 131 (concluding that public employees, who are
subject to these constitutional constraints, would have their liberty impinged by extending
the Constitution beyond a reasonable interpretation). The government, through the
utilization of unions, must subject its performance to constitutional scrutiny, or else the
Constitution would be undermined. Id. at 131–32. Without the constitutional scrutiny, the
50
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The Taft-Hartley Act

Congress recognized the need to enforce employment agreements to
limit employees from free riding on the provided services and benefits.55
The Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 added several rights for employers and
employees by giving them both the right to refrain from joining unions
and giving the unions the right to require membership within thirty days
of employment.56 In the union shop arrangement, employees may be fired
for failing to pay the required dues.57 The Taft-Hartley Act arose from the
congressional concern over intimidation from unregulated monopolists
over employees.58

government could authorize private parties for tax collection, elections, law enforcement,
and benefit distribution with none of the required constraints by the constitution. Id. at 132.
55
See Raymond L. Hogler, The Historical Misconception of Right to Work Laws in the United
States: Senator Robert Wagner, Legal Policy, and the Decline of American Unions, 23 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 101, 131–32 (2005) (recognizing that making employment conditional on
union membership was necessary to combatting the free rider issue). However, employees
were not required to pay dues used for purposes other than the cost of operation. See
Hutchison, supra note 44, at 464 (providing the potential abuses of compulsory unionism).
In addition, the collective goods provided by the government are theoretically nonexcludable and makes the prevention of free-riding necessary to offset the total costs. Id. at
477.
56
See Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (equalizing the legal
responsibilities of employers and labor organizations, providing additional facilities for
mediations concerning labor disputes in regards to commerce, and amending the NLRA).
The NLRA transformed labor relations to a more balanced scheme by guaranteeing freedoms
of speech among employers and employees, and the NLRA added more restrictions for
unions. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (“Employees shall have the right . . . to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement
requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized
in section 158(a)(3) of this title.”); see also HIGGINS, JR., supra note 53, at 41 (emphasizing the
need for collective bargaining and federal protection of rights of employees to form unions).
57
See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963) (noting that union membership
could only be conditioned upon payment of fees and could be a condition of employment).
In addition to the fee requirement, the union shop agreement requires employees to follow
the labor contract by working with the union for any issues concerning the terms of
employment. See Roberto L. Corrada, Religious Accommodation and the National Labor Relations
Act, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 185, 223 (1996) (explaining the requirements and protection
provided by Section 8(a)(3)). The union shop agreement also provides for the union to be
designated as the exclusive representative for all employees. Id. at 224.
58
See supra note 55, at 130 (stating that the legislatures favored individuals over unions in
the new law). The Taft-Hartley Act provided protection to employees from unfair union
practices. See 1947 Taft-Hartley Substantive Provisions, NLRB, http://www.nlrb.gov/whowe-are/our-history/1947-taft-hartley-substantive-provisions
[http://perma.cc/T6YXSY88] (focusing on the purpose behind the Taft-Hartley Act). In addition to providing
protection to employees, the Taft-Hartley Act prohibited unions from charging dues that
were excessive or not performed. Id.
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The Taft-Hartley Act enacted section 14(b), giving states the ability to
entirely disallow union security agreements. 59 Even though every state
has discretion to use Section 14(b), the right to work law prohibits
employers and unions from using union membership as a condition for
employment.60 The right to work law also makes security clauses
unenforceable by unions, including agency fee arrangements. 61 Under
Section 14(b), unions are still required to provide benefits to non-payers
because state law bars unions from compulsory membership. 62 The
See 29 U.S.C. § 164(a) (2012) (holding that employers cannot condition employment
based on union membership); see also Michael L. Wachter, The Striking Success of the National
Labor Relations Act, 37 REG. 20, 23 (2014) (describing Section 14(b) as allowing states to
mandate the open-shop agreement if the right to work laws passed within the state). The
open-shop agreement permits employees to not pay dues or join a union. Wachter, supra
note 59, at 23. See Jeanne Mirer, Right-to-Work Laws: History and Fightback, 70 NAT’L L. GUILD
REV. 30, 33 (2013) (noting that unions challenged the law on many different grounds). The
unions stated the following as challenges against the right to work laws:
(1) [T]hat these laws abridged freedom of speech, assembly and the right
to petition; (2) that they conflicted with Art. I, § 10, of the United States
Constitution [because] they impaired the obligation of contracts made
prior to their enactment; (3) that they denied equal protection of the laws
and (4) that they denied due process by interfering with liberty of
contract.
Id. Each argument failed. Id.
60
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1032 (expressing that the Taft-Hartley Act
gave states with right to work laws the ability to prohibit union security and agency fee
agreements). In right to work states, employees who are union members are required to
subsidize the benefits to coworkers that choose not to join the union. Id. at 1033.
61
See Norman L. Cantor, Uses and Abuses of the Agency Shop, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 61,
61 (1983) (stating that there is a union security agreement between the NLRA and Railway
Labor Act (“RLA”) that requires all employees represented by a union to contribute an
equivalent amount of initiation fees and periodic dues that are required by full members).
The workers who choose not to be union members are still bound by the security
arrangement, known as an agency shop. Id. at 61–62. The agency shop fees are used for the
union’s activities ranging from contract functions to institutional costs. Id. at 62. See Kenneth
Glenn Dau-Schmidt et al., The Great Recession, the Resulting Budget Shortfalls, the 2010 Elections
and the Attack on Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the United States, 29 HOFSTRA LAB. &
EMP. L.J. 407, 428–29 (2012) (discussing the basis behind right-to-work and the agency fees).
The following is a break-down of the number of states with right to work laws from 2012:
There are currently twenty-three states that have “right to work” laws
either by state or via constitutional provision. Eleven states passed right
to work laws either before or contemporaneously with the passage of
the Taft-Hartley amendments in 1947. Seven states passed right to work
laws in the 1950s. . . . Despite spirited opposition and a boycott by
Democrats, the House and Senate Republicans passed the legislation,
and Governor Daniels signed it on February 1, 2012, making Indiana the
twenty-third right to work state.
Id. at 429–30.
62
See Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318, 328–29 (1953) (holding that right-to-work laws
prohibit unions from enforcing compulsory membership dues on non-members, and the
statutory duty still requires the unions to provide the benefits to non-members).
59
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current member dues subsidize services for non-members that opt out of
the agency fee system.63 Subsidizing dues from current members
decreases the amount of money for unions to spend on collective
bargaining.64 Some states utilize fee for service agreements where nonmembers are charged only for the services that directly impact them
within the industry.65 In addition, cases and statutes exist that permit
unions to charge non-members for a small list of services, such as utilizing
arbitration and filing grievances.66 The unions and employers, for both
right to work states and states that recognize union security, can only
enforce agency fees on non-members to facilitate the administering and
negotiating of the employment contract.67 Several suits were filed and the
case law began to develop after the Taft-Hartley Act passed.68

See Martin H. Malin, Does Public Employee Collective Bargaining Distort Democracy? A
Perspective from the United States, 34 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 277, 294 (2013) (describing that
in the absence of an agency shop agreement, union membership will decrease and the
member dues used to subsidize representation of non-members will increase).
64
See id. at 292 (explaining that the union is required to represent all employees within
the bargaining unit, so the members must subsidize the non-members that are employed
within the same unit). Overall, funds for collective bargaining will decrease with an absence
of a security fee provision because employees will choose the rational decision to not join a
union. Id. Improved working conditions and wages sought by the union are considered
collective goods and cannot be withheld from non-members of the union. Id.
65
See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1033 (expressing that unions utilize fee for
service agreements in right to work states). Even in states that have not adopted right to
work laws, unions and employers cannot force an employee to join a union. Id. at 1034. The
unions can only require non-members to pay an agency fee. Id.
66
See, e.g., Cone v. Nevada SEIU Local 1107, 998 P.2d 1178, 1182 (Nev. 2000) (holding that
the service fee requirement for arbitrations does not violate the right to work laws of Nevada
because the fee is not a condition of employment); United Ass’n of Journeymen Local Union
No. 81, 237 N.L.R.B. 207, 209–10 (Nev. 1978) (stating that for use of union hiring halls, the
unions can charge non-members fees). But see United Ass’n of Journeymen Local Union No.
141 v. NLRB, 675 F.2d 1257, 1259, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (examining that right to work laws in
Louisiana, Florida, Mississippi, and Arkansas prohibit fair share fees); Am. Fed’n of State,
Cty. & Municipal Emps., AFL-CIO, Local 2384 v. City of Phoenix, 142 P.3d 234, 245 (Ariz.
2006) (determining that the union’s fair share agreement violates Arizona’s right to work
law); Florida Ed. Ass’n/United v. Public Emps. Relations Comm’n, 346 So.2d 551, 553 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (identifying that the right to work law in Florida prohibits fair share
fees).
67
See NLRB v. Gen. Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 737 (1963) (acknowledging that
conditional employment can require payment of monthly dues and initiation fees). The
agency fees cover union expenditures for retirement and educational benefits, union
promotional activities and publications, and for strike benefits. Id. However, being a nonmember of a union eliminates the entitlements of voting on ratification of union agreements,
attending union meetings, or having a voice within the union’s internal affairs. Id.
68
See infra Part II.B–D (detailing the progression of case law regarding the freedom of
association and agency fees associated with union membership).
63
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B. Building up to Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
In Railway Employees’ Department v. Hanson, the Supreme Court
rejected the agency fee system.69 In Hanson, employees of the railroad
company brought the suit against the Union Pacific Railroad Company
and separate labor organizations seeking to enjoin the implementation of
a union shop agreement between the labor organizations and the railroad
company.70 Before Abood and Harris, the Court in Hanson made two
important holdings: (1) the Court held that the Railway Labor Act’s
(“RLA”) preemption of the right to work laws adequately supported the
union shop agreements protected by the Constitution; and (2) the Court
held that unions compelling financial support do not violate the First and
Fifth Amendments due to the employees still receiving benefits. 71 The
Court made no holding regarding the issue of compulsory membership
impairing employees’ freedom of expression and left it for another court
to address.72
See 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (recognizing that the exaction of initiation fees, dues, or
assessments could be used as a disguise to force an ideological viewpoint on the employee,
and should not be allowed). In Hanson, the Union Pacific Railroad Company employees
sought to prohibit the enforcement of the RLA between the labor organization and railroad
company because of a violation of Nebraska’s right to work provision. Id. at 227–28. The
RLA’s original purpose was to strike down and supersede inconsistent state laws. Id. at 231–
32. The agency fee system is an alteration of private taxation where all employees, including
non-members, of a public-sector union paid dues as a condition for government
employment. See Himebaugh, supra note 45, at 536 (stating that this private taxation was for
the purpose of safeguarding the unions, even if the public employees objected to being
members of a union).
70
See 351 U.S. at 227 (examining the terms of the union shop agreement as requiring
membership of the unions within sixty days as a condition of their employment). The Court
relied upon the RLA, which permitted a labor organization to require employee membership
of the labor organization and could terminate the membership for failure to pay the dues.
See 45 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (requiring labor organizations to maintain agreements concerning
rules, rates of pay, working conditions, and settling disputes). Without the RLA superseding
the state right to work laws, a private agreement between the nonprofit union organization
and the private employer might have been conjured with the union compelling membership
dues combined with the subsequent union expenditures. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note
41, at 1034 (explaining that the private agreement would make the First Amendment
irrelevant to the issue).
71
See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 232 (describing that as long as the union agreements were
pursuant to the RLA, then no provision could make the agreements illegal under the first
holding). The second holding stated that the requirement of financial support is within the
scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause, which does not violate the First or
Fifth Amendments. Id. at 238; see also Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1034 (identifying
the two important holdings in Hanson).
72
See Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (acknowledging that the Court will not address the
impairment of freedom of expression). Congress made explicit that the only conditions that
can be imposed on union members are initiation fees, period dues, and assessments. Id. The
Court ultimately held that financial support for collective bargaining purposes does not
69
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Five years later, the Court addressed the issue of employees’ freedom
of expression in International Association of Machinists v. Street.73 In Street,
employees of the Southern Railway System brought a constitutional claim,
alleging that compelled funds were wrongfully used for political
propaganda and ideologies that most employees opposed.74 The Superior
Court enjoined the enforcement of the union shop agreement based on a
violation of the Constitution because the constitutional right to be free
from government compulsion has higher value over the expression of
opinions.75
The Supreme Court recognized constitutional questions as concerning
the “utmost gravity,” but then failed to address these questions. 76 Instead,
the Court held the RLA limited the power of unions to spend exacted
money.77 In addition, the Court interpreted the statute as eliminating the
union’s power, over an employee’s objection, to use his union dues for

violate the First Amendment and the Commerce Clause supports it. Id.
73
See 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (confirming the current case as being adequate to present
the constitutional issues reserved in Hanson). Hanson did not address the issue of using
agency shop fees for the advancement of political causes. See Cantor, supra note 61, at 67
(clarifying that the plurality refused to address the constitutional issue by interpreting the
RLA in a narrow way).
74
See 367 U.S. at 742 (explaining the allegation for the claim). The employees alleged that
section 2 of the RLA was unconstitutional because it allowed unions to use compulsory dues
for financing political campaigns that were opposed by objectors. See Roger C. Hartley,
Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 1, 19 (1989) (recognizing that employees opposed the propaganda of economic and
political doctrines advocated by the unions).
75
See Street, 367 U.S. at 744–45 (stating that the Superior Court enjoined the enforcement
of the union shop agreement because demanding funds from employees violates the Federal
Constitution). Men and women migrated to the United States to free themselves of
government compulsion of ideas they were knowingly against. See id. at 796 (examining that
migrants went to the extent of languishing in prison and losing their lives to oppose
government oppression). Once the government steps into a voluntary membership
organization and forces a particular cause on a group, then the government may have a
monopoly on the ideas of its people. Id.
76
See id. at 749 (identifying that the Court should refrain from making unnecessary
constitutional decisions that are outside the scope of the statutory language concerning
union shop agreements). Instead of reaching the constitutional decision, the Court
recognized that Hanson identified the limits on compulsory dues that explained the RLA’s
statutory constraints over objectors of union activity. See Hartley, supra note 74, at 19
(reviewing the reason why the Court did not have to make a constitutional decision in the
case to provide the necessary remedy to the parties).
77
See Street, 367 U.S. at 768 (holding that Congress did not give complete approval to
union shop agreements). The Court did not want to provide precise limits on the power to
spend required dues on political causes. Id. In addition, the Court recognized that political
uses of exacted funds do not defray the costs for administration or negotiation of collective
agreements. Id. Therefore, the Court held that unions cannot support political activity
against the dissenting employees’ wishes. Id. at 770.
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opposing political causes.78 In other words, if an employee objects to a
portion of the union dues used for political purposes, the union has no
recourse or right to enforce the dues.79 The principles from the majority
in Hanson and Street remained the same until 1977 with Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education, which dealt with the public-sector.80
C. 1977 Paradigm of Abood v. Detroit Board of Education
In Abood, the Detroit Federation of Teachers was designated as the
exclusive representative for teachers employed within the Detroit Board
of Education.81 The agreement contained an agency shop clause that
See id. at 768–69 (discussing the holding as achieving both congressional purposes when
using the funds that are directly within the dissenting employee’s interest). The Court
explained that the role of unions are delineated and defined to stabilize labor relations across
any industry. See id. at 758–59 (recognizing every stage in the progression of the railroad
labor code was progressively infused with a balance of the organizing railroads and railroad
unions). In addition, non-union members sharing the same benefits as members for no cost
(free riders) weighed against an argument for complete recognition of freedom of choice for
individuals. See Street, 367 U.S. at 762–63 (acknowledging the challenges of unions that
exclusively represent all of the employees in an industry, including those who do not share
in payment of the dues). In this case, the RLA contemplated compulsory unionism to battle
the costs of disputes against forcing employees to provide the costs for administering and
negotiating collective agreements. Id. at 763–64. However, the Court held that Congress did
not intend to compel employees to support opposing political causes that are different from
their own beliefs. Id. at 764. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter argued that
members’ interests could be furthered by political means. Id. at 813–15. He explained that
the AFL-CIO Executive Council Reports stressed the importance of labor’s participation in
furthering legislation quickly because the political and economic concerns are inseparable.
Id. at 813. The dissent further argued that the employees were free to speak on any issue
concerning the union’s position, which equated to no coercion of speech within union
activism. See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 41, at 1036 (explaining that the dissent believed
that the employees were not forced to give up any beliefs or views by the government).
Furthermore, the dissent believed that any member may express his views freely in any
private or public forum before the union collected his dues, which was contrary to the
majority opinion of coerced speech. Street, 367 U.S. at 806.
79
See Street, 367 U.S. at 768 (examining that funds cannot be used for purposes outside the
expenses of negotiation). The NLRB requires unions to inform every employee of the
opportunity to become non-members. See How Do I Cut Off the Use of My Dues for Politics and
Other Nonbargaining Activities?, NAT’L RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEF. FOUND.,
http://www.nrtw.org/a/a_4_p.htm [http://perma.cc/YDF7-3ZCL] (composing a list of
requirements that unions must furnish to all employees). In addition, information must be
provided that states non-members have the option to opt out of paying for dues not central
to the union’s duties. Id. Furthermore, unions must provide sufficient information allowing
the non-member to make an intelligible decision. Id. Moreover, unions must tell the
employees about the procedures of filing objections with the union. Id. If a non-member
does object to the political expenditures, then the union must provide a calculation of the
deduction, which the non-member can challenge at a later date. Id.
80
See infra Part II.C (analyzing the right to impose agency fees on public employees).
81
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211–12 (1977) (establishing the Detroit
78
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required every teacher who was a non-member of the union to pay the
same service charge and regular dues as a union member. 82 A group of
teachers sued, alleging that they opposed the union’s use of collective
bargaining in the public-sector due to their funds being used for the
union’s engagement in religious, professional, scientific, political, and
economic programs.83
The Court reasoned that agency shop provisions were linked with the
principle of exclusive representation. 84
Exclusive representation
promoted labor peace because it prevented inter-union rivalries among
the work force.85 The concept was that one representative entity was
Federation of Teachers as the exclusive representative for teachers in 1967). The collective
bargaining agreement was effective between the dates July 1, 1969, to July 1, 1971. Id. at 212.
82
See id. (examining the agency shop clause requirement that required every teacher who
was a non-member of the representative union to pay a service charge equal in amount to
the full-fledged union members).
83
See id. at 212–13 (reflecting that a substantial sum of the payments was used for activities
other than for limiting bargaining agent costs).
84
See id. at 220 (stating that a central element in industrial relations is exclusive union
representation). In Abood, the Court reasoned that the holdings in Hanson and Street would
go far toward resolving the First Amendment issue. See id. at 217 (beginning with Hanson
and Street to determine whether an agency shop provision within a collective bargaining
agreement can be considered constitutionally valid). The Court recognized that Street did
not reach any of the constitutional issues. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 219–20 (interpreting that
Hanson failed to answer important constitutional questions that need to be solved in the
current case). The Court dismissed the teachers’ argument because the interference was
constitutionally justified due to the union shop being of substantial importance to the labor
relations system. See id. (acknowledging that the judgment made in Hanson and Street made
the interference constitutionally justified).
85
See id. at 220 (recognizing the benefits of having only one union, rather than many). In
addition, the Court recognized that requiring employees to financially support unions has a
direct impact on First Amendment rights. See id. at 222 (clarifying that employee First
Amendment interests are impacted when the employee is compelled to financially support
a union). The Court gave the following as examples of potential impacts on the First
Amendment interests of the employees:
An employee may very well have ideological objections to a wide
variety of activities undertaken by the union in its role as exclusive
representative. His moral or religious views about the desirability of
abortion may not square with the union’s policy in negotiating a
medical benefits plan. One individual might disagree with a union
policy of negotiating limits on the right to strike, believing that to be the
road to serfdom for the working class, while another might have
economic or political objections to unionism itself. An employee might
object to the union’s wage policy because it violates guidelines designed
to limit inflation, or might object to the union’s seeking a clause in the
collective-bargaining agreement proscribing racial discrimination.
Id. The primary reason for the union shop agreements was to solve the problems of free
riding from non-members and to promote labor peace. See id. at 260 (explaining that the
agency shop reduces the risk of free riders among non-union employees by fairly
distributing the costs for exclusive representation and promoting labor peace among public
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better than two because the employers would not have to worry about
establishing different terms, thus making the system more efficient. 86 In
addition, the union, acting as an exclusive representative of the
employees, frees the employer from facing conflicting demands from
multiple unions, and avoids attacks from rival labor unions.87
When addressing the free rider issue, Abood noted that unions must
represent all employees, including union and non-union members.88 This
amount of responsibility and difficulty of exclusive representation
requires a lot of time and money, which makes free riding on benefits an
issue for unions in continuing to successfully represent employees. 89 The
union shop arrangement distributed the costs amongst the employees that
benefit from services and reducing the incentive to then take advantage of
the free benefits.90
The appellants in Abood argued that Hanson and Street should not be
followed because they dealt with unions in the private sector, rather than
employees).
86
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 220 (imposing a single representative is more efficient and creates
less confusion than enforcing multiple union agreements with varying conditions and
terms). This philosophy was created over the disgust for independent unions before the
passage of the NLRA. See Rabban, supra note 40, at 693 (demonstrating the purpose behind
exclusive union representation).
87
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (examining the benefits of having only one union); see also
Rabban, supra note 40, at 693 (mentioning that unions promote efficiency within the
workforce by being the only representative for all employees).
88
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (finding that unions must fairly and equitably represent every
employee in carrying out its duties). To overcome the free rider issue, the Court allowed
union compulsion through the use of union security agreements. See Benjamin I. Sachs,
Unions, Corporations, and Political Opt-Out Rights After Citizens United, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
800, 815 (2012) (discussing that unions can compel employees to financially support unions
to combat the free rider issue).
89
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 221 (stating that representing the interests of the employees is
difficult and requires a lot of time and money). Unions claim that they spend a majority of
the compelled dues for representation, contract negotiations, or non-political work. See
Jarrett Skorup, The Union “Free-Rider Problem” Myth in Right-to-Work Debate, CAPCON (Dec.
10, 2012), http://www.michigancapitolconfidential.com/18017 [http://perma.cc/L79NW5JS] (exploring Michigan’s evolution as a right to work state). According to union
documents, activities classified as representational totaled eleven percent of the union’s
expenditures. Id. Another argument along with the free rider issue is that nobody is required
to be in a union. Id. The distinction comes down to not whether someone is required to be
in a union, but that they are compelled to pay association fees that can represent up to ninety
percent of the full member dues. Id.
90
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 (describing the union shop agreement as counteracting the
incentive to obtain the benefits for free). Unions spent over $4.4 billion on electing political
candidates, and twelve of the top twenty political donors were unions. See Skorup, supra
note 89 (inquiring into the substantial amount of funds used toward politics). There is a
discrepancy with the placement of political funds with three percent of total political
expenditures going towards the Republican Party, even though forty percent of union
members vote for the Republican Party. Id.
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the public sector, which would require an alternate result. 91 The Court
noted that even though private and public employers seek to keep costs
down, the public employers lack the ability to oppose increases in labor
costs that can be dealt with in the private-sector through adjustments in
an established market.92 In addition, the Court noted that public
employers are responsible to the electorate, comprising of government
employees, taxpayers, and users of government services.93 Given the
opportunity for the government representatives to agree with the union’s
demands, the Court reasoned that public employees have more of an
impact in the decision-making process compared to employees in the
private-sector.94 Even with these differences, the Court held that the
collective bargaining differences between the private and public-sector do
not equate with differences in First Amendment rights.95

See Abood, 431 U.S. at 227–28 (noting that an alternative conclusion must be reached
under the Constitution because collective bargaining by public sector unions is inherently
political).
92
See id. (stating that concerns over decreases in employment and costly wage demands
are less of a concern for public-sector unions). In Michigan, unions represented roughly
38,500 state employees in 2008 and received around $450.00 per employee. See Paul Kersey,
News Release: State Government Paid $17.6 Million to Unions in 2008, According to Documents
Secured by FOIA Request, MACKINAC CTR. FOR PUB. POL’Y, http://www.mackinac.org/10326
[http://perma.cc/57EA-MRQY] (analyzing the millions of dollars in agency fees to unions).
One of the problems with the unions is accounting for their spending. Id. Less than half of
the union costs went to employee representation, and over ten percent accounted for political
spending. Id.
93
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 228 (explaining that the decision-making process by the public
employer is inherently a political process); see also Tom Gantert, Early Returns on Michigan as
a Right-to-Work State: Incomes Rising, CAPCON (July 25, 2014), http://www.michigancapitol
confidential.com/20319 [http://perma.cc/9PY7-BNNG] (recognizing that educational
attainment explains the variances in state incomes).
94
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 229 (explaining the argument that public employees are in a better
position to make an impact in the decision-making process). Even though public employees
could make more of an impact within the decision-making process, the public-sector union
memberships still decline similar to the private sector. See Craig Becker, The Pattern of Union
Decline, Economic and Political Consequences, and the Puzzle of a Legislative Response, 98 MINN.
L. REV. 1637, 1639 (2014) (acknowledging the downward trend in union memberships, both
in the private and public-sector). The recession and changes in public-sector employee rights
contributed to the decline of union membership. Id.
95
See Abood, 431 U.S. at 232 (reiterating that the First Amendment rights are the same in
collective bargaining issues for both the public and private sector). The public-sector unions
are political because the government pays the wages and benefits of its members, with
lobbying being the sole advocacy system to raise compensation. See Steven Greenhouse,
Supreme Court Ruling on Union Fee Is a Limited Blow to Labor, N.Y. TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/01/business/supreme-court-ruling-on-publicworkers-and-union-fees.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/J6V8-MU7X] (examining the effect on
the treasuries and memberships of the unions).
91
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D. Harris v. Quinn
In Illinois, Section 676.10 of the Illinois Administrative Code
establishes an employee-employer relationship between the personal
assistant and the person receiving the care.96 The personal assistant in this
context encompasses individuals employed by a client to provide a variety
of services approved by a physician. 97 In this situation, the customer
controls the employment relationship between the personal assistant and
the customer.98 Even though the customer controls the employment
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2623 (2014) (discussing that the personal assistant’s
employer is the person receiving the home care). This relationship is important in the context
of Harris because the unions have less of a need to step in to represent employees that do not
interact with each other. See GERALD MAYER, UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS IN THE UNITED
STATES 17 (2004) (finding that focusing more on employees’ concerns increased job
satisfaction of non-members of the union, including the personal assistants). Illinois was one
of the first states to establish the Medicaid funds program and created the Illinois
Department of Human Services Home Services Program, known as the Rehabilitation
Program. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2623 (summarizing the factual background before the
Court). The Rehabilitation Program provides homecare services for individual needs. Id. at
2624. Medicaid funds programs that offer in-home services to people that would normally
need institutionalization, such as requiring transfer to a nursing home. Id. at 2623. The
following code establishes the offered program:
The Secretary may by waiver provide that a State plan approved under
this subchapter may include as “medical assistance’” under such plan
payment for part or all of the cost of home or community-based services
(other than room and board) approved by the Secretary which are
provided pursuant to a written plan of care to individuals with respect
to whom there has been a determination that but for the provision of
such services the individuals would require the level of care provided
in a hospital or a nursing facility or intermediate care facility for the
mentally retarded the cost of which could be reimbursed under the State
plan.
42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c)(1) (2012). Up until this was permitted, personal assistants were not
considered state employees. See Jacob Huebert, Harris v. Quinn: A Win for Freedom of
Association, CATO SUP. CT. REV. 195, 196 (2013–14) (stating that personal assistants were not
considered public employees until the recognition of the Rehabilitation Program). The
designation of personal assistants as state employees may not have been a big deal for
unionization because the employers adapted to meet the employees’ concerns. See Amanda
McHenry, Comment, The NLRB Wields Its Rulemaking Authority: The New Face of
Representation Elections, 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 589, 601 (2011) (acknowledging work
satisfaction increased and unionization decreased).
97
See ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 676.30(p) (2014) (authorizing the personal assistants to
help elderly people with home care services); see also Keith Kelleher, Harris v. Quinn: Another
Nail in the Coffin or Shot in the Arm for Labor?, http://progressillinois.com/quickhits/content/2014/09/01/harris-v-quinn-another-nail-coffin-or-shot-arm-labor
[http://perma.cc/DLD4-DEHZ] (admitting that the Service Employees International Union
(“SEIU”) effectively collectively bargained for increased wages immediately following the
decision in Harris).
98
See ILL. ADMIN CODE tit. 89, § 676.30(b) (authorizing the customers to have control over
the business relationship); see also Ronald J. Kramer & Joshua L. Ditelberg, Harris v. Quinn:
96
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relationship, the State, through Medicaid subsidizations, pays the
personal assistant salaries.99 Other than payment of the salaries, the
State’s involvement is limited.100
In Harris, three personal assistants (“petitioners”) filed a complaint on
behalf of all Rehabilitation Program personal assistants seeking an
injunction against implementing the fair-share provision, and to hold the
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“PLRA”) in violation of the First
Amendment for requiring personal assistants to pay fees to a union with
opposing views.101 The District Court dismissed the claim and the
Seventh Circuit determined that they were employees of the State.102 The
Roadmap for the End of Fair Share?, LAW360 (June 30, 2014), http://www.law360.com/
articles/553168/harris-v-quinn-roadmap-for-the-end-of-fair-share [http://perma.cc/F8QF7THQ] (recognizing the regulation designated the employer as the customer for the personal
assistants). The customer who received the care controlled nearly all aspects of the
employment relationship. See Kramer & Ditelberg, supra note 98 (furthering the proposition
that the personal assistants were not in charge of the employment relationship).
99
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626 (acknowledging that the payment comes from the nonunion member personal assistants).
100
See id. (explaining that the State’s involvement primarily deals with compensation, but
the rest is minimal). In March 2003, Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich, issued an executive
order recognizing the SEIU as the personal assistants’ exclusive representative for collective
bargaining purposes with the State. See id. (describing the executive order as circumventing
the Illinois Labor Relations Board decision). This order provided personal assistants with
the opportunity to voice any concerns about their jobs to help “efficiently and effectively
deliver home services.” See id. (detailing the concern with the personal assistant’s lack of
structure to voice any concerns). Once the Act was codified, personal assistants were
considered public employees of Illinois and covered under the PLRA. See 20 ILL. COMP. STAT.
2405/3(f) (2014) (stating that the personal assistants were public employees only for
purposes of coverage). After the implementation of the statute, SEIU and Illinois agreed over
collective bargaining agreements requiring all personal assistants that are non-union
members to pay a reduced rate in dues, also referred to as a fair share rate. See Harris, 134 S.
Ct. at 2626 (identifying that non-membership dues would be deducted from the Medicaid
payments to the personal assistants).
101
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626 (recognizing the case before the Court as dealing with three
personal assistants under the Rehabilitation Program). The PLRA permits state employees
to become members of labor unions and bargain collectively over the conditions and terms
of employment. See 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(a) (2014) (authorizing the state employees to
join unions). The PLRA has an agency fee provision requiring non-members of the union to
pay a union fee. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2625 (examining the agency fee provision and its
effect on non-members). The PLRA considers this a “fair share” provision, which states the
following:
When a collective bargaining agreement is entered into with an
exclusive representative, it may include in the agreement a provision
requiring employees covered by the agreement who are not members of
the organization to pay their proportionate share of the costs of the
collective-bargaining process, contract administration and pursuing
matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment . . . .
5 ILL. COMP. STAT. 315/6(e). Ultimately, the fair share provision is taken out of the nonmember employee salaries and paid to the union. See id. (discussing the requirement that
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Supreme Court granted certiorari when other states classified personal
assistants as state employees, which raised important First Amendment
questions.103
The Court in Harris reaffirmed the belief that Abood is “somewhat of
an anomaly” and directed the focus to Abood as the precedent to
analyze.104 Illinois sought to extend the ruling of Abood to include fullfledged public employees and quasi-public employees to collect an agency
fee from personal assistants.105 Unlike the characteristics of full-fledged
unions must certify with the employer that each non-member proportionate share amount
that cannot exceed the regular membership dues).
102
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (holding that State employees are personal assistants within
Abood because the customers and Illinois are considered joint employers of the personal
assistants).
103
See id. (noting an Illinois law that defines home healthcare workers as public employees,
including licensed practical nurses, registered nurses, and private therapists). Not only has
the Court stepped in to solve the issue, but Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner issued an
executive order giving employees the option to opt out of fair share agreements. See Paul
Meincke, Rauner Eliminates “Fair Share” Union Dues for State Workers, ABC 7 (Feb. 09, 2015),
http://abc7chicago.com/politics/rauner-eliminates-fair-share-union-dues-for-stateworkers/510528/ [http://perma.cc/YDR5-7KAV] (reflecting on the new executive order
issued to eliminate fair share union dues). The Governor declared the agency fee system as
neither legal, nor fair, and moved to put an end to fair share agreements. Id.
104
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (citing Knox, which explains that the free-rider arguments
are not enough to overcome the First Amendment objections). The Court in Harris further
discredited Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association for personal assistants. See id. at 2636 (rejecting
Lehnert’s reasoning); Lehnert, 500 U.S. 507, 556 (1991) (concluding that a union cannot
discriminate between non-members and members in administering and negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement). The Court stressed that the union could not sacrifice
higher pay because of statutory requirements specifying the hourly pay rate for personal
assistants. See Harris, 134 U.S. at 2637 (detailing that unions should not have to give up
higher membership pay for non-member protection). Furthermore, the Court noted that
customers have complete control over the personal assistant’s work, which eliminated the
union’s authority over grievances with personal assistants. See id. (explaining that the
union’s authority over the personal assistant employment is virtually non-existent). The
main difference the Court recognized was that the grievance procedure for personal
assistants should deal directly with the customer, not with the State. See id. (acknowledging
that in regard to personal assistants, the union’s purpose was for grievances with the state,
rather than for the client).
105
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2627 (arguing that the expansion should include public
employees for unionization). The Court noted that with respect to full-fledged public
employees, the State establishes all of the duties for each employee and qualifications for
each position. Id. at 2634. The following includes other functions that are characteristics of
full-fledged public employees:
The State vets applicants and chooses the employees to be hired. The
State provides or arranges for whatever training is needed, and it
supervises and evaluates the employees’ job performance and imposes
corrective measures if appropriate. If a state employee’s performance is
deficient, the State may discharge the employee in accordance with
whatever procedures are required by law.
Id.
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public employees, personal assistants are employees of the customers.106
For that reason, the Court recognized that Abood was not controlling,
therefore, the analysis shifted to whether the compelled payments were
constitutional under First Amendment standards.107 After analyzing the
constitutionality of the payments, the Court recognized that the agency
fee provision in this case is not commercial speech, which would make the
standard too permissive.108
The Court recognized that there was no link between the right to
receive an agency fee from non-members and the exclusive bargaining
agent status of the union.109 In addition, the agency fee system in Harris
did not play a significant role in preserving labor peace because the
employees did not interact with each other. 110 The Court then addressed
whether the agency fee provision promoted the welfare of personal
assistants.111 Harris held that the agency fee provision could not be

See id. (describing the State as having no provision to check in on the personal assistants
during the job performance). Illinois withholds most of the rights and benefits from personal
assistants that are used by full-fledged state employees. Id. at 2634–35.
107
See id. at 2639 (examining the constitutionality of the compelled payments of nonmembers of public-sector unions). In evaluating the agency shop agreement, the Court
looked at United States v. United Foods, Inc. within the analysis of Knox v. SEIU, where a
provision that required the subsidization of commercial speech was struck down. See Harris,
134 S. Ct. at 2639 (acknowledging the compelled speech in Knox as different than its
precedent, but still capable of stirring the passions of many); see also Knox v. SEIU, Local
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2296 (2012) (stating that individuals should not be forced to subsidize
private speech).
108
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2639 (expressing that the speech in the case extends beyond
commercial speech that only proposes a commercial transaction). In addition, the provision
did not complete the compelling state interest test under strict scrutiny. See Knox, 132 S. Ct.
at 2289 (explaining the free rider arguments as insufficient to defeat First Amendment
objections).
109
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 (“For example, employees in some federal agencies may
choose a union to serve as the exclusive bargaining agent for the unit, but no employee is
required to join the union or to pay any union fee.”). The link is in accordance with federal
law that gives the employee the right to form, join, or refrain from a labor organization
without penalty. See 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012) (establishing the employees’ right to organize).
110
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 (recognizing the argument that agency fees play an
important role as undermined by the Illinois scheme). The Court realized that personal
assistants work in the customers’ home, not in a common state facility, which diminished
any threat to labor peace. See id. (reiterating that a lack of a common state facility diminished
the concern over a conflict of labor peace). Congress affirmed this theory by giving
employees in domestic service the right to opt out of coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (2012)
(excluding individuals employed with the domestic service of families or personal homes).
111
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2640 (determining the success between the Rehabilitation
Program and the agency fee provision). Respondents claimed that the benefits and wages
improved, along with procedures to resolve grievances. See id. at 2640–41 (arguing that the
benefits of the union through training programs and grievance procedures makes collective
bargaining necessary for the sector).
106
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sustained because the benefits provided from the unions could have been
achieved through voluntary contributions.112
Harris rejected Illinois’ argument to extend Abood and allow unions to
collect agency fees from non-members.113 The Court stressed that
adhering to Illinois’ argument would be an unprecedented violation of the
principle providing no person can be compelled to support speech by a
third party that he or she has no interest in supporting.114 The Court held
that the First Amendment forbids collecting agency fees from personal

See id. at 2641 (acknowledging that the agency fee provision should be allowed only if
the benefits could not be obtained without the fees paid by the personal assistants to join the
union); see also Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 877 (1961) (mandating that lawyers have
the same protection provided in the RLA for railroad workers). The Respondents urged the
Court to apply and balance the Pickering test with the agency fee. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at
2641 (seeking to find a new justification for Abood’s decision). The Court began by dismissing
the argument because the State and personal assistants were not in their traditional roles. Id.
at 2642. The reasoning behind the decision stems from the Pickering case, stating that speech
regarding public concern can be restricted if the interest of the state in promoting the public
services executed through its employees outweighs the employees’ interest in being able to
comment on issues concerning the public. Id. The Court recognized that Medicaid funding
would be a matter of great public concern, which required the Court to proceed to the next
test. Id. at 2642–43. The next test measured the interference with the First Amendment
compared to the degree the agency fee promoted efficiency for the Rehabilitation Program.
Id. at 2643. The Court noted that agency fees impose a heavy burden on the objecting
employees’ First Amendment rights. See id. (asserting that the objecting employee First
Amendment rights have a heavy burden when agency fee provisions are imposed); see also
John Eastman, Harris v. Quinn Symposium: Abood and the Walking Dead, SCOTUSBLOG (June
30, 2014), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/harris-v-quinn-symposium-abood-andthe-walking-dead/ [http://perma.cc/SS2D-T379] (recognizing that the heart of the
arguments used to uphold compulsory union fees could no longer stand). The Court
finalized the issue by holding that the provision could not be upheld as analyzed under
Pickering. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2643.
113
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (refusing to extend Abood consistent with Illinois’
arguments). The Freedom Foundation is suing SEIU 925 and Washington State for family
home-care providers that are being forced to pay union dues. See Jim Brunner, Labor Law
Challenged:
Freedom Foundation Sues SEIU 925, SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 6, 2015),
http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/freedom-foundation-files-suitagainst-seiu-925/ [http://perma.cc/83B4-6DPA] (stating that ruling in Freedom
Foundation’s favor will give all public workers the right to associate with any organization).
114
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (“[E]xcept perhaps in the rarest of circumstances, no person
in this country may be compelled to subsidize speech by a third party that he or she does not
wish to support.”); see also Bureau of Int’l Lab. Aff., Freedom of Association & Collective
Bargaining,
U.S.
DEP’T
OF
LAB.,
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/issues/foa-cb/
[http://perma.cc/DQA8-2X36] (discussing the importance of freedom of association and
collective bargaining). California public school teachers are also arguing to opt out of agency
fees. See Deborah J. LaFetra, Rescuing Teachers from the Grasp of Forced Unionism, PLF LIBERTY
BLOG (Feb. 26, 2015), http://blog.pacificlegal.org/2015/rescuing-teachers-grasp-forcedunionism/ [http://perma.cc/47XX-N4BE] (noting that the public school teachers believe the
time is right to review the garnishment of paychecks by unions to protect their freedom of
association).
112
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assistants in the Rehabilitation program who do not wish to support the
union.115 While partially abandoning the Abood standard, Harris reversed
the judgment in part and affirmed in part.116
E. Fundamentals of the Freedom of Association
The First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the right to freedom of
association for individuals.117 As early as 1958, the Court noted that the
freedom to engage in associations to advance ideas and beliefs is inherent
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 118 In addition,
freedom of association is a fundamental part of a free society, similar to
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (prohibiting agency fees from personal assistants in the
Rehabilitation program). However, other people believe the inclusion of a ban on the union’s
ability to charge agency fees will decrease the union membership and could make the right
of workers to organize obsolete. See Mirer, supra note 59, at 38 (analyzing that unions seek
to protect, rather than harm, the interests of union members). The current trend for public
employees is voting against unionization to avoid having non-members essentially waive
their freedom of association. See Bruce Parker, Vermont’s Child Care Providers to Remain NonUnionized, VERMONTWATHCDOG.ORG (Mar. 3, 2015), http://watchdog.org/203206/
unionized-childcare-vermont/ [http://perma.cc/VN3B-A8MF] (recognizing that Vermont
child care providers should not have to be under the union representation if they choose to
be non-members of a representative union).
116
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2644 (reversing the Court of Appeals judgment in part and
affirming in part). Even though the Court acknowledged the First Amendment concerns that
arise over government coercion through agency fees, the ruling was still considered a
devastating blow to public-sector unions. See Tom McCarthy & Samuel B. Gedge, Harris v.
Quinn Symposium: A Quiet Blockbuster?, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/
07/harris-v-quinn-symposium-a-quiet-blockbuster/#more-214791 [http://perma.cc/Z44JF4BU] (discussing the arguments for the support of the agency fee).
117
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 201 (identifying that previous Supreme Court holdings
have protected the right to freedom of association under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments); see also Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 309–11 (1986)
(holding that the teacher’s union could not collect agency fees from non-members in
accordance with the Constitution). The use of an auditor was considered overly broad to
determine the accurateness of the expenditures. See Andrews v. Educ. Ass’n of Cheshire,
829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987) (utilizing the auditor as an independent decision maker and
in the traditional sense makes the scope of employment too vague). In determining the
accurateness of the expenditures, absolute precision on behalf of the auditor is not necessary
for public-sector unions. See Am. Fed’n of Television & Recording Artists, Portland Local,
327 N.L.R.B. 474, 477 (1999) (recognizing that all that is needed for the determination of the
expenditure accurateness is just a verification that the expenses were made).
118
See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (explaining that the Fourteenth
Amendment embraces free speech, including the right to advance economic, cultural,
religious, or political matters); Donata Marcantonio, Knox v. Service Employees
International Union: Balancing the First Amendment with Fairness Under Union-Shop
Agreements, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 211, 211 (2012) (examining the need for
speech regulations to be minimally restrictive for analysis under the First Amendment);
Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir. 1984)
(expressing that federal statutes require safeguards for non-members of unions).
115
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that of free speech.119 Furthermore, freedom of association assumes a
freedom not to associate with a public union. 120
As previously shown, the Court acknowledged that serious risks are
imposed on the government when employees are required to pay
subsidies for speech by recognizing the Court’s ability to completely
prevent the compelled speech.121 The Court held that if the contributions
are used to support political or ideological causes that the employee
opposes, then the employers’ First Amendment rights are impinged,
regardless of the time or money spent for such purposes.122 In addition, a
mode of business that requires an employee to support a certain political
party violates his or her First Amendment right.123 Freedom of association
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (acknowledging the State’s burden of
demonstrating a sufficiently important interest and closely drawn means to violating the
freedom of association). A likely challenge the opposition would raise to the First
Amendment challenge for implementing the proposed statute is stare decisis, but the
argument is unlikely to work. Huebert, supra note 96, at 219. The majority in Citizens United
v. FEC states that the Court will overrule decisions that offend the First Amendment while
overruling a twenty-year old precedent. See 558 U.S. 310, 363 (2010) (highlighting that the
Court will overrule a precedent if the decision was offensive to the First Amendment).
Several factors were identified by the Court in Citizens United when considering whether to
overturn a precedent: (1) “whether the decision was well reasoned;” (2) “the reliance
interests at stake;” (3) “the antiquity of the precedent;” and (4) the shortcomings of the
precedent. Id. The Court in Harris held that the experience over the course of history pointed
to Abood’s shortcomings. See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633 (referring to the practical problems of
non-members who object and the abundant administrative problems with union
expenditures).
120
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (emphasis added) (acknowledging
that freedom of association allows people to be a member of any organization); see also Gary
Pecquet, Private Property and Government Under the Constitution, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.
(Jan. 1, 1995), http://fee.org/freeman/detail/private-property-and-government-under-theconstitution [http://perma.cc/3DYZ-M7G4] (weighing the economic concerns of the
individual liberties that are protected by the Constitution).
121
See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 410–11 (2001) (recognizing the risks
inherent with compelled subsidies of speech). Even if employees that are non-members
continue working after being compelled to pay agency fees, the continuation of employment
does not mean that non-members waived their constitutional right to freely associate with
any organization. See College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 682 (1999) (comparing the effective waiver of constitutional rights with
being compelled to give up a fundamental right). In addition, unions can avoid subsidizing
speech by becoming members-only organizations if they elect to not become the exclusive
bargaining agent of an industry. See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014)
(justifying that unions are justly compensated by the right of being the exclusive bargaining
agent).
122
See Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 305 (1986) (reasoning that the
concern is not diminished based on each individual amount at stake); see also Elrod v. Burns,
427 U.S. 347, 359 n.13 (1976) (evaluating that rights are infringed both when the government
withholds or fines a grant of money based upon the political party of the individual).
123
See Elrod, 427 U.S. 347, 355 (1976) (discussing the freedoms of association and belief). In
addition, there is a right to be free from any unwanted government intrusions that impede
119
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plays a significant role in the analysis of Harris, leading to the needed
amendment of the Employees’ Rights statute.124
III. ANALYSIS
The majority’s treatment of Abood suggests that the Justices will
overrule the case in the future.125 The good thing is the employers’ rights
will be protected once the court rules in their favor; the bad thing is there
is no way of knowing when another case with the perfect fact scenario will
reach the Court. First, Part III.A analyzes the freedom of association and
its importance in society.126 Then, Part III.B examines the error in analysis
and reasoning behind Abood, and why Congress should step in and give
all public employees the right to refuse agency fees.127 Next, Part III.C
reviews the uncertainty of Abood’s ruling, which gives more credit to
Congress amending the employees’ rights statute to eliminate the Abood
standard.128 Next, Part III.D analyzes the impact Harris v Quinn will have
in the short and long term.129 Finally, Part III.E examines the future
ramifications of the decision.130
A. Importance of Freedom of Association
The analysis in Abood suggests that public-sector unions can compel
an employee to pay an agency fee, but this was suspect over time with the
development of case law.131 To uphold the unions’ measures of charging

on a person’s privacy. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (introducing the right
of freedom of association as one that the framers of the Constitution sought to protect the
pursuit of happiness).
124
See infra Part IV (discussing the proposed statute to move the right to opt out of agency
fees from quasi-public employees to all public employees due to the inconsistencies of the
Supreme Court cases).
125
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (inferring the majority is ready to overturn Abood
based on the evisceration of its reasoning in Harris).
126
See infra Part III.A (examining the agency fee with the freedom of association).
127
See infra Part III.B (discussing the errors in the analysis of Abood with regard to a
misapplication of two cases).
128
See infra Part III.C (describing why the Court was unable to make the decision to
overturn Abood in Harris).
129
See infra Part III.D (observing the short term and long term impacts the case will have
on unions and the public sector).
130
See infra Part III.E (exploring the impact this decision will have on public-sector jobs).
131
See Knox v. Serv. Emps., 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2290 (2012) (acknowledging an anomaly exists
with the free rider argument in justifying compelling non-members to pay a reduced amount
of union dues). Abood treated Hanson and Street as if they had resolved the First Amendment
infringement issue when the government coerces union support. See Huebert, supra note 96,
at 205 (stating that Abood never solved the First Amendment issues).
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members, the charge must serve a compelling interest. 132 However,
permitting public unions to collect fees from non-members crosses the
limits of the First Amendment.133 When balancing the state and individual
interests together, the First Amendment weighs largely in favor of
individual rights.134 The framers of the U.S. Constitution intended our
rights to be free from governmental force, which separates our nation
from others.135
The constitutional right to freedom of association inherently gives an
individual the option to not associate with an organization. 136 For
instance, if an employee wants to join an organization, he may do so, but
if his personal beliefs contradict the organization’s beliefs, then he may
opt out of a membership and forgo any dues associated with the
process.137 Continuing to allow unions to force public employees to pay
agency fees would violate the long recognized rule that public employees
have the right to refuse payment of dues to unions that are contrary to
their own political beliefs.138 The Employees’ Rights statute needs to be
See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291 (recognizing that the procedure incorporated by the union
is required to satisfy a high standard). The union in Harris had to prove the agency fee served
a compelling interest. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that the
agency fee did not fulfill the compelling state interest requirement).
133
See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2291 (“By authorizing a union to collect fees from non[-]members
and permitting the use of an opt-out system for the collection of fees levied to cover non[]chargeable expenses, our prior decisions approach, if they do not cross, the limit of what the
First Amendment can tolerate.”).
134
See Marcantonio, supra note 118, at 211 (establishing that the speech restrictions must
be minimally restrictive to abide by the First Amendment). The Court weighed in favor of
individual First Amendment interests under strict scrutiny review. Id. at 226.
135
See Pecquet, supra note 120 (highlighting the freedom of religion, freedom of speech,
and the right to assembly as rights exercised against the government). All the rights not
specifically given to the government remain with the citizens. Id.
136
See Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (interpreting the freedom of
association as providing the opportunity to not associate). First Amendment concerns are
raised when an individual is compelled to support an organization that is against his own
beliefs. Id.; see Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, 743 F.2d 1187, 1193 (7th Cir.
1984) (analyzing that a state cannot deprive a person of his freedom of association by
compelling him to financially support a union).
137
See McCarthy & Gedge, supra note 116 (describing that hundreds of thousands of
personal assistants within the home caregiver market will be free to cease payments for
union memberships). The personal assistants in Harris are now able to keep the agency fee
amount in their own pockets. Id.
138
See Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292, 302 n.9 (1986)
(discussing the right of public employees to refuse compulsory dues); Elrod v. Burns, 427
U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (asserting that orderly group activity must be considered with the
freedom to associate in the advancement of political beliefs). As a fundamental right, public
employees should be free to make their own decisions. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 357. The concept
is that the state should not coerce the public employee into its own beliefs, but should allow
the public employees the freedom to form their own beliefs. Id.; see also Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (inferring that the power of the government to control men’s minds
132
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amended to put a halt to the continued deprivation of the non-member’s
freedom of association.139
The Court does not “presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental
rights.”140 This statement suggests that public workers do not presumably
acquiesce to losing their freedom of association through silence or
action.141 The union supporters argue for the continued implementation
of the agency fee because the agency fee produces labor equality in
bargaining power for the employees and eliminates the free rider
problem.142 The agency fee makes unions capable of supporting all public
employees without producing an undue burden of representing a group
of people for free. 143 The contention that the agency fee prevents free
riders misses the key issue that all public employees have the right to
freely choose who they want to be associated with and support. 144 Harris
mentions that freedom of association is a fundamental right and should
be treated as such.145
would make our constitutional heritage rebel).
139
See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment to the Employees’ Rights statute to give all
public employees the right to opt out of agency fees).
140
College Savs. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
682 (1999). The lack of acquiescence associated with the loss of the freedom of association is,
to a lesser extent, comparable to racial discrimination. Id. If someone of a racial minority
refused to speak up against discrimination in a public place, that does not mean he
acquiesced to the discriminatory treatment. Id. Similarly with the public employee’s right
to freely associate with an organization, an employee does not acquiesce to losing his
freedom of association through silence and should not lose his job for failing to pay dues. Id.
141
See id. (providing the insight that courts presume people do not waive their
fundamental constitutional rights). In comparison, people that commit securities fraud
would normally not waive their constitutional right of trial by jury. Id. In a similar matter,
employees that are forced to pay fees to unions do not inherently waive their right of freedom
of association. College Savs. Bank, 527 U.S. at 682.
142
See McCarthy & Gedge, supra note 116 (discussing the arguments for the support of the
agency fee). In addition, one belief suggests that the laws aimed at unions should be illegal
in its entirety. See Mirer, supra note 59, at 38 (articulating that the opposition believes the
agency fee produces equality in bargaining power for employees).
143
See Mirer, supra note 59, at 33 (discussing the negative impacts of free riders on the
union membership system). Unions stress that they need resources to cover the costs of
collective bargaining. Id. In addition, unions believe that their bargaining power decreases
with a lack of funds. Id. However, Harris recently ruled that First Amendment objections
are generally sufficient to overcome free rider arguments. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct.
2618, 2627 (2014) (pointing out that the free rider arguments under Abood are insufficient to
overcome the First Amendment arguments).
144
See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) (explaining that the union’s
requirement to represent every employee is optional and does not justify the use of an agency
fee). The requirement is optional because the union can opt to become a members-only
union, thus eliminating the need to require just compensation of all employees. Id.
145
See Bureau of Int’l Lab. Aff., supra note 114 (articulating that the ability to organize is at
the basis of freedom of association). The Bureau of International Labor Affairs promotes
freedom of association by enforcing labor rights within free trade agreements. Id. Union
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B. Error in the Analysis of Abood
The Court in Harris raised many errors within the analysis of Abood.146
First, Abood never examined whether there was a compelling
governmental interest with preserving labor peace and preventing free
riding, which is why the Court relied upon Hanson and Street.147 The
Court in Abood based its decisions on questionable grounds and did not
foresee the practical problems associated with its decision. 148 In particular,
the Court incorrectly relied upon Hanson and Street, as these cases did not
touch on the constitutional issue of compulsory payments to public-sector
unions.149 Hanson disposed of the question in one sentence and Street
ultimately did not make, or attempt to make, a constitutional decision. 150
This failure amounts to a serious error in the analysis of Abood and
produces further questions with regard to the constitutionality of agency
members cannot be prevented from speaking out at a public meeting in opposition of the
regulation because this is at the heart of the expansion of worker influence on the employers.
Id.
146
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (describing that Abood’s analysis was questionable in many
ways).
147
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 203 (stating that the Court did not examine how the
dissenting employees could have their First Amendment rights protected). The Court held
that the government could compel public employees who were non-members to pay agency
fees to cover the costs of collective bargaining. Id. At the time, the infringement was justified
to prevent free riders from abusing the union’s representation services, and this would avoid
the conflict and competition of rival unions within the same sector. See Abood v. Detroit Bd.
of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 260–61 (1977) (highlighting the argument of requiring agency fees to
combat confusion and conflict amongst the public employers).
148
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633 (holding that a major problem with the system is that
auditors do not correct the categories of union expenditures); Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n,
500 U.S. 507, 519 (1991) (“[C]hargeable activities must (1) be ‘germane’ to collectivebargaining activity; (2) be justified by the government’s vital policy interest in labor peace
and avoiding ‘free riders’; and (3) not significantly add to the burdening of free speech that
is inherent in the allowance of an agency or union shop.”). Auditing the correctness of the
union’s categorization of expenditures is problematic. Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2633. Auditors do
not make legal determinations as to the correctness of chargeable expenditures. Id. Instead,
the auditors only make sure that expenses were actually made. Id.; see Andrews v. Educ.
Ass’n of Cheshire, 829 F.2d 335, 340 (2d Cir. 1987) (ensuring that the payments the union
claims it made for specific expenses were actually made for the listed expenses); Am. Fed’n
of Television & Recording Artists, Portland Local, 327 N.L.R.B. 474, 477 (1999) (recognizing
that auditors do not have the expertise to make legal findings determining the chargeability
of certain expenditures).
149
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (“The Abood Court seriously erred in treating Hanson and
Street as having all but decided the constitutionality of compulsory payments to a publicsector union.”).
150
See id. at 2630 (noting that neither of the cases reached the constitutional issue); see also
Int’l Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961) (stating that the constitutional
questions were of the utmost gravity, but the Court did not want to touch those issues); Ry.
Emps.’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956) (comparing the requirement of joining a
state bar association with compulsory membership dues imposed by unions).
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fees and compulsory payments because all public employees would have
been given the right to opt out of agency fees had Abood correctly
interpreted Hanson and Street.151
Second, Abood extended its authority beyond the interpretation that
should have been implemented by imposing the agency fee, rather than
authorizing the implementation of the agency fee. 152 The closest Hanson
came to supporting compulsory fees was a statement that, when
compared to a state law requiring membership of an integrated bar,
created no impairment or infringement of First Amendment rights.153 The
Court expanded its reasoning in Abood because compulsory integrated bar
memberships were never held to be constitutional before Hanson.154 Five
years later, Justice Douglas, in Hanson, raised questions about his
reasoning by changing his stance on furthering the protection of the First
Amendment through prohibiting compulsory memberships for the
integrated bar.155
Third, Abood did not answer the constitutional questions concerning
compulsory dues and freedom of association. 156 Instead, the RLA was
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (suggesting that Abood did not decide the constitutionality
of compulsory payments). Abood’s treatment of Street and Hanson produced further
questions in analysis. Id.
152
See id. (describing the imposition of the fee, rather than the authorization of the fee, as
presenting a different type of question to the Court). The fundamental misunderstanding
was that Hanson declared the authorization of union shop agreements constitutional, rather
than the imposition of union shop agreements. Id.
153
See id. at 2629 (acknowledging that lawyers can be compelled to become a member of
an integrated bar). In Hanson, the Court held that the RLA was constitutional in the
authorization of union shop contracts. See Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (applying the reasoning in
Hanson to Street’s factual scenario); see also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (holding that the
requirement does not violate the First or Fifth Amendments).
154
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2629 (explaining the reasoning as remarkable because the Court
never addressed the constitutionality of compulsory membership dues to an integrated bar);
see also Hanson, 351 U.S. at 238 (proposing the analogy of a lawyer joining the state bar
association with unions compelling membership fees); Robert Post, Transparent and Efficient
Markets: Compelled Commercial Speech and Coerced Commercial Association in United Foods,
Zauderer, and Abood, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 555, 565 (2006) (describing that Abood raised issues
that could affect two First Amendment rights: freedom of association and freedom of
speech).
155
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2629 (examining the inconsistencies of Justice Douglas’
reasoning). The states compel lawyers to join the bar, but do not require a similar
membership for dentists, nurses, or doctors. See Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 878 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that doctors, nurses, and dentists are excluded). These
groups protect the public and, along with other groups, increase the vital services across the
nation. Id. Subsequently, Justice Douglas thought the analogy he used in Hanson failed
because being partially regimented behind causes the lawyers oppose are not compatible
with the First Amendment. See id. at 878–84 (connecting the analogy between lawyers joining
an integrated bar and an employee being compelled to join a union).
156
See Street, 367 U.S. at 749 (determining that the Court should weigh against unnecessary
151
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construed as not giving the unions unlimited power to spend compelled
dues to support political causes that employees oppose. 157 This is not to
say that all public employees oppose union memberships, but those who
do, should not be compelled to pay the agency fee associated with the
union.158 However, the mere fact that Street did not make a constitutional
decision raises questions about the foundation of Abood’s analysis by only
addressing the power of unions to spend compelled dues, rather than the
constitutionality of compelling non-members to make payments to
organizations in opposition of their own views. 159
The arguments for the implementation of agency fees failed because
the free rider arguments were not enough to overcome the First
Amendment objections.160 Justice Alito reviewed the Court’s rulings on
mandatory union fees before Harris.161 He created the following analogy
for further review:
constitutional decisions if Congress made this intention clear in the statute). The Court
recognized the importance of the constitutional questions by phrasing them with the utmost
gravity. Id.; see also Paul Kulwinski, Trust in God Going Too Far: Indiana’s “In God We Trust”
License Plate Endorses Religion at Taxpayer Expense, 43 VAL. U. L. REV. 1317, 1365 (2009)
(applying the Abood analysis for private speech when the government is forcing taxpayers to
fund a private message on a license plate that is in opposition with their own beliefs).
157
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2630 (establishing that the Court decided not to address the
constitutional issue). The Court further explained the union could give a refund for the
employees that object to the funds used for political causes. Id.; see Arlen W. Langvardt,
Public Concern Revisited: A New Role for an Old Doctrine in the Constitutional Law of Defamation,
21 VAL. U. L. REV. 241, 255 n.109 (1987) (expressing that ethical, literary, social, economic, and
artistic matters are entitled to First Amendment protection in its entirety).
158
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 210 (acknowledging that up until Knox, the non-members
could be forced to pay union fees). The Court in Knox recognized the flaw and gave the
suggestion that the Court may reconsider Abood in a subsequent case. Id. The issue in Knox
was whether non-members of a union could be required to pay a temporary increase in fees
for political purposes with no opportunity to opt out and no notice. See Knox v. SEIU, Local
1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2284–85 (2012) (recognizing the public-sector union issue within Knox).
The Court held that the First Amendment did not permit the union to increase the fees with
no notice when coupled with the opportunity to opt out. See Huebert, supra note 96, at 210
(reporting that seven Justices decided that First Amendment protection disallowed unions
to increase their fees).
159
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2631 (ruling that Street did not reach any constitutional issues
and was resolved as a matter of statutory construction.); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220 (1977) (holding that the RLA could be construed to avoid the
constitutional issues).
160
See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289 (stating that First Amendment objections carry more weight
than the free rider arguments). For example, a community organization that cleans a
geographical area would have citizens that free ride on their services. See Huebert, supra
note 96, at 210 (suggesting that doctors may be free riders under a medical lobbying group).
Few people would argue that the citizens within the community should have to pay for the
services. Id.
161
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 210 (examining whether Justice Alito’s majority opinion
took the necessary step to question the mandatory union fees, thus producing inconsistencies
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If a community association engages in a clean-up
campaign or opposes encroachments by industrial
development, no one suggests that all residents or
property owners who benefit be required to contribute. If
a parent-teacher association raises money for the school
library, assessments are not levied on all parents. If an
association of university professors has a major function
bringing pressure on universities to observe standards of
tenure and academic freedom, most professors would
consider it an outrage to be required to join. If a medical
association lobbies against regulation of fees, not all
doctors who share in the benefits share in the costs. 162
The free rider argument is considered an anomaly because the argument
works solely to further labor peace.163
Fourth, there was also a great concern with non-member funds paying
for political activities.164 Justice Alito correctly noted that if union
employees opt in the full-fledged union fees, as opposed to the opt out
strategy, then the risk of using fees to further ideological ends would
cease.165 Justice Alito raised a good point when he asked rhetorically why
the burden should be on the non-member when opting out of making the
payments because there was an inherent unfairness imposed on the public
employees.166 In addition, employees would face a significant burden if
they were required to raise issues concerning their subsidized speech
when unions could impose a new assessment of chargeable expenditures
at any time.167
among the Court and furthering the need for statutory change).
162
Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289–90. The agency fee primarily promoted labor peace and reduced
the employees from free riding on the services. Id. at 2290.
163
See id. (acknowledging the anomaly with accepting the free rider arguments to further
labor peace). The Court used the anomaly to further labor peace in the past. Id.
164
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 211 (stressing concern over the burden on non-members
to ensure that none of their funds were being used for political activity). The concern mainly
deals with the burden being placed on the employees for protection against coerced speech.
Id.
165
See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (stating that an opt out system, as opposed to an opt in
system, establishes a risk that funds will be used for political purposes); Huebert, supra note
96, at 211 (recognizing the impingement on the employees’ freedom of association with the
opt out system imposed by unions).
166
See Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2290 (questioning the justification for placing the burden on the
non-members of a union to show that they do not want to pay for the extra costs when they
inherently have less bargaining power). The Court should have a system of accountability
so that non-member funds are not used, even temporarily, to fund political activities. Id.
167
See id. at 2294 (establishing that unions can create chargeable expenditures by utilizing
a broad viewpoint in its description to the auditors). In addition, objecting employees would
have to utilize more funds, on top of the amount compelled by the unions, to object to the
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Fifth, Abood failed to distinguish compelled support between publicsector and private-sector unions due to the public-sector unions’
capability of fulfilling many civic and political positions during its role in
collective bargaining.168 Unlike a private employer, the government
makes decisions concerning employee pay that directly affect public
policy through taxpayer dollars, thus requiring the need for change
through amending the Employees’ Rights statute.169 As a government
employer, the roles of collective bargaining and lobbying in the public
sector are closely related and is a key reason why the analysis concerning
private employees in Hanson and Street should not be used.170
In Abood, the Court made a distinction between non-members opting
out of paying fees for activities not relevant to collective bargaining, and
the government authority compelling the non-member’s support for
activities in connection with collective bargaining. 171 This distinction is
unclear because both types of speech are political, but still does not clarify
whether non-members will be forced to pay unions for political speech
unrelated to collective bargaining.172 Furthermore, the effort to uphold
First Amendment rights could make little sense for non-members because
that would require the non-members to review the union’s expenditure
report and proper use of employee funds. 173

union’s chargeability determinations. Id. In essence, there is a barrier to entry for
challenging the union expenditures. Id.
168
See id. at 2289 (describing the reason why compulsory fees are compelled speech and
prohibited by the First Amendment). Knox did not revisit prior cases to determine if First
Amendment rights provided adequate recognition. Knox, 132 S. Ct. at 2289. See Huebert,
supra note 96, at 205 (distinguishing the flaw in Abood’s analysis between the public-sector
and private-sector unions). Unions that deal with government employees are inherently
political, and the First Amendment case law prohibits forced support of political speech. Id.
169
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 205–06 (acknowledging that unions take positions that
have powerful civic and political consequence). In this regard, the government is not similar
to a private employer. Id.
170
See Lehnert v. Farris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507, 520 (1991) (supporting the close
analogy between collective bargaining and lobbying because of the dual roles of the
government as the policymaker and employer). In the case of personal assistants, unions are
essentially lobbyists that can legally force employees to pay for its advocacy. See Huebert,
supra note 96, at 206 (identifying that unions can only argue for more money and benefits).
171
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977) (deciding that the
Constitution only requires that expenditures be funded from dues, assessments, or charges
paid by non-objecting employees that are not coerced into joining against their will).
172
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 206 (acknowledging that non-members may still be
compelled to pay because the union’s auditors do not question the credibility of chargeable
union dues).
173
See id. at 207 (examining the costly efforts needed to challenge a fraction of the fees
associated with switching from being a member to being a non-member of a union, including
participating in hearings, filing the unfair labor practice charge with the court, and pursuing
appeals).
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The coerced union support harms the employees’ First Amendment
rights and distorts the influence on public policy. 174 If the government
coerces people with opposing views to support a contrary group, then the
political forum is non-existent.175 The public unions are given an unfair
advantage because the cost to compete against them may be prohibitively
high for employees.176
Sixth, if Illinois’ argument to expand the coverage of Abood to
government subsidy recipients were upheld in Harris, the distortion
would expand beyond the subsidy recipients. 177 Forcing a union fee on
subsidy recipients essentially gives the union more state funds to achieve
whatever political goals the union has in mind, including reelecting the
same state officials who enabled the unionization and supported their
policies.178 In addition, if people opt out of the union dues, they will still
pay for some of the representation. 179 As a consequence of appointing
representatives for the subsidy recipients, the incumbent officials could
shift the electoral process in their favor and weaken the competition in
governmental policies and ideas that the First Amendment is designed to
protect.180
Creating a cycle to fund political officials with union dues moves
away from what should be the primary purpose: collective bargaining. 181
See id. at 207–08 (exposing the bias coerced speech has on the marketplace for political
ideas towards the union’s favor that potentially decreases everyone’s ability to influence
public policy). In Knox, the Court stated that the First Amendment created an environment
where all can achieve their political goals without hindrance from the state. See Knox v.
SEIU, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2295 (2012) (requiring public-sector unions to obtain the
non-members affirmative consent before they exact funds from those non-members).
175
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 207–08 (asserting that coercing one group to support
another cannot exist under the Constitution).
176
See id. at 208 (discussing that the costs of opposing union views may be too high for
employees to voice an opinion, thus effectively chilling employee speech).
177
See id. (stressing the bad consequences resulting from the expansion). The problem with
covering government subsidy recipients is that the Abood standard would expand to all
subsidy recipients, rather than just personal assistants. Id.
178
See id. (inferring that requiring subsidy recipients to pay dues to a union is good for
politicians, but bad for employees because the money goes to the politician’s pockets).
Change must be made to the current labor law for unions to continue serving the collective
bargaining purpose. See Becker, supra note 94, at 1647 (acknowledging that the law must
change because the political parties evolve their behavior to the law).
179
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 208 (recognizing little doubt that non-members will have
to pay for some of representation expenses due to the burden placed on the employees to
opt out of the union’s political funding).
180
See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 357 (1976) (noting that the right to support a political
association goes to the heart of the First Amendment). The protection provides an
opportunity for uninhibited debate on political issues. Id.
181
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 209 (exposing the system where the officials receive
monetary funds from employees, and in turn, make contributions to public officials). The
personal assistants did not satisfy the compelling governmental interest of labor peace. See
174
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The government officials are aware of the many political opportunities
from the unionization of personal assistants. 182 In Harris, the executive
orders raised more questions about compelled speech through agency fees
because the orders benefited top political supporters for both governors. 183
For instance, the groups affiliated with SEIU were former Illinois
Governor Pat Quinn’s largest contributors, donating approximately
eighteen percent of all contributions—much more than all the amounts
combined from the Democratic Party committee. 184 The Court knew the
impact unions have on political parties, which is part of the reason why
the Court declined to overturn Abood at that time.185
C. Uncertainty of the Ruling
The Court did not want to make the decision to overturn Abood for
two reasons.186 First, only five votes were needed to overturn Abood, and
the critics believe the Court hesitated to overturn the precedent because of
the uncertainty of the fifth vote.187 People believe the Court decided to
wait for another case to become relevant in the judicial system to address
the issue more precisely, which gave the Justices more time to understand
the importance of overturning Abood.188 Adaptation was the second
id. at 216 (stating that labor peace was not a compelling government interest in Harris). The
assistants did not intend to compete with the union, just the right to opt out of contributions
to the union. See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2640 (2014) (holding the agency fee does
not satisfy the Knox test). The conflicting demands were lessened because the union’s
purpose was to increase pay and benefits, while providing little to no other benefits. Id.
182
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 208 (describing the government officials as being well
aware of the opportunities from the unionization of personal assistants).
183
See id. at 209 (asserting that SEIU gave roughly $825,000 to Blagojevich’s 2002
campaign). Two months after Blagojevich began his term as governor, he recognized SEIU
as the exclusive representative for personal assistants. Id.
184
See id. (expressing that SEIU gave over $4.3 million to Governor Quinn’s election). The
power to force union support could create a cycle where unions make monetary donations
to public officials; the public officials compel the subsidy recipients to make monetary
contributions to the union; and the union makes more contributions to the public officials.
Id. This system effectively compels employee speech. Id.
185
See supra note 181 and accompanying text (discussing the system of using funds to
promote public officials).
186
See Eastman, supra note 112 (examining the reasons against completely overturning
Abood).
187
See id. (stating that one or more of the Justices in the majority thought Abood could not
be properly distinguished, which delayed the overruling until another case comes to the
court with more applicable facts).
188
See id. (recognizing the need to wait to make a subsequent decision on the matter).
Another case that may come to the Court’s docket deals with public teachers from California.
See LaFetra, supra note 114 (recognizing that Abood has been detrimental for individual rights
for over forty years). Between the time of Harris and this Note being published, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued an opinion in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association that concerned
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reason people believe the Court decided to wait for a new case.189 The
holding in Harris v. Quinn is a major step towards overturning Abood and
expanding the right to refuse agency fee payments to all public
employees.190 If the Court, instead, decided to expand the initial holding
from quasi-public employees having the right to opt out of agency fees,
the decision would have been outside the scope of the facts in the case. 191
The reason the decision would have been outside the scope is because
Harris did not deal with full-fledged public employees, but rather a hybrid
form of a public employee that was solely considered to be public for
collective bargaining reasons.192 Furthermore, by waiting for a different
fact scenario in another case to address all public employees, the unions
have more time to adapt to the new rule and prepare for Congress to give
all non-members the right to disassociate themselves from agency fees
without repercussions.193
The ruling in Harris further introduces more ambiguity into the law,
rather than clarity.194 Justice Kagan’s dissenting opinion noted the
majority created a perverse result by punishing the state for managing its
program in a decentralized way that respects the independence and

overruling Abood, No. 14-915, 2016 WL 1191684, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2016). After oral arguments,
but before the issuance of this opinion, Justice Scalia passed away, which led to the Court
splitting four-to-four in a one sentence opinion on the issue of overruling Abood. Id. Thus,
the Court set no legal precedent and left the constitutional issue still in the air, which further
necessitates the need for this Note's proposed amendment to the Employees’ Rights statute.
Id.
189
See Eastman, supra note 112 (discussing the potential future attacks on Abood that may
be brought within the near future).
190
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits unions from collecting agency fees from personal assistants). The Court noted that
third parties are not allowed to subsidize speech from people that do not wish to support the
material. Id.
191
See Eastman, supra note 112 (describing the process of completely overturning Abood
would restructure employment across the country). Eastman believes that there was at least
one Justice in the majority that will choose not to overrule Abood outright. Id. The courts
also proved that public employees should be treated differently than private employees
because they are different. Id.
192
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2626 (establishing the requirement for vicarious liability in tort
and advocating for health insurance benefits). The union was used solely to retrieve
feedback from the personal assistants to make their home delivery services more efficient.
Id. at 2641. The Court raised that the analysis was questionable on several grounds. See
Eastman, supra note 112 (acknowledging that the Court did not distinguish between public
union expenditures for political ends and collective bargaining purposes).
193
See infra Part IV (recognizing the need for an amendment to the employees’ rights
statute to give all public employees the right to opt out of agency fee payments).
194
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (stating that the ambiguity of the analysis is a reason
for the court to completely overrule Abood). The analysis in Abood is also poorly reasoned,
but the Court’s composition could change with newly elected Justices. Id.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2016

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 2 [2016], Art. 7

610

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

dignity of program beneficiaries.195 If the state were to classify quasipublic employees similar to full-fledged public employees, in regard to
converting subsidy money to unwanted benefits, then would the payment
of a mandatory union due be any more just?196 The result in this scenario
produces more government control over personal assistants, healthcare
patients, and coerced union fees, which is the true conflict within the
reasoning.197 This line of questioning should result with the expansion of
freedom of association to all public employees by amending the
Employees’ Rights statute.198
D. The Impact of Harris v. Quinn
The impact of Harris v. Quinn will be significant for unions.199 In the
short-term, over 20,000 personal assistants in Illinois will no longer be
subject to agency fees.200 The effect may similarly expand to other states
as well.201 This change could produce a negative impact on the unions
because of the decrease in funding to support union expenditures. 202
However, after overruling Abood and expanding the holding in Harris to
all public employees through amending the Employees’ Rights statute, the
likelihood of the continued existence of the unions is high because other
organizations have shown success by surviving off of only membership
fees.203 In addition, the home-care workers in SEIU Healthcare Illinois

See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2650 (Kagan, J, dissenting) (explaining the majority decision
reached a perverse result by not following the legal precedent).
196
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 218 (acknowledging the disadvantages of treating quasipublic employees as full-fledged public employees). California teachers state that forcing
public school teachers to make payments to labor unions violates their First Amendment
rights. See LaFetra, supra note 114 (articulating that the Abood standard proved to be
insufficient over time to protect the constitutional rights of public employees).
197
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 218 (noting that it is not satisfactory to force employees to
pay union fees that they do not want to pay). Other industries in the public-sector are
moving away from unionization. See Parker, supra note 115 (stating that the home child care
businesses throughout Vermont voted against unionization by a vote of 418 to 398). The
union will have to wait another year before filing for another vote. Id.
198
See infra Part IV (explaining the Employees’ Rights statute needs to be amended to give
all public employees the right to associate with any organization of their choice).
199
See Kramer & Ditelberg, supra note 98 (discussing the potential short and long term
impact resulting from Harris).
200
See id. (describing the proportion of full union members versus fair-share fee payers as
unknown).
201
See id. (acknowledging the decrease in funding may hinder unions in their ability to
represent all employees in the bargaining unit).
202
See id. (explaining the significance to the labor movement). 38.7% of the public-sector
employees are represented by a union. Id. If public-sector employees do not have to pay the
agency fees, it may be a critical blow to the public-sector unions. Id.
203
See infra Part IV (stating that unions can still function without the agency fee).
195
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project a wage increase after the decision of Harris.204 This increase
suggests that the union goals of increasing the working standards will
continue even without the agency payments from quasi-public
employees.205
The long-term impact needs to be addressed to fully conceptualize the
magnitude of Harris.206 The holding will likely bring an increase in
litigation that will sway the tipping point from quasi-public employees to
encompass all public employees because of the necessity to protect the
freedom of association.207 In addition, the decrease in funding could
decrease the political power of the public sector unions. 208 However,
unlike what many union supporters believe, employers have been
adamant about improving the working conditions to better serve
employee needs, thus taking away from the unions’ purpose. 209
Furthermore, this decision could expand to the private sector, but that is
beyond the scope of this Note.210
E. Future Ramifications of the Inconsistent Holdings
There will be future ramifications once Congress steps in to deal with
the inconsistent holdings.211 In states that eliminated the requirement of
agency payments by non-union members, the total number of jobs and the
union memberships increased.212 In contrast to benefits, the amount of
funding necessary for union expenditures may significantly decrease. 213
See Kelleher, supra note 97 (showing that in the year of 2014, SEIU membership amount
increased to 10,000 personal assistants within the home care industry). But see Brunner, supra
note 113 (recognizing that some state employees are still paying for the political functions of
unions even after notifying the unions and objecting numerous times).
205
See Kelleher, supra note 97 (explaining that the ruling in Harris will be a shot of
adrenaline for the unions and employees).
206
See infra Part IV (expanding on the holding in Harris by providing an amendment to the
Employees’ Rights statute).
207
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that the First Amendment
prohibits unions from collecting agency fees from personal assistants); see also Kramer &
Ditelberg, supra note 98 (stating the potential short-term and long-term impact about the
future of unions).
208
See McHenry, supra note 96, at 601 (reasoning the decline in union membership is due
to the failure of the union’s adjustment to the economic realities).
209
See Mayer, supra note 96, at 17 (finding that there is greater job satisfaction among nonmembers of unions because some unions adapted to focus more of their intention on
employee concerns).
210
See infra Part IV (acknowledging that the contribution deals with public employees).
211
See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 236 (1977) (noting that unions can spend
funds on political purposes as long as the employees do not object).
212
See Gantert, supra note 93 (stating that the jobs and wages increased in right to work
states).
213
See Mirer, supra note 59, at 33 (discussing the negative impacts of free riders on the
union membership system). The depletion in money from the agency fees suggests that the
204
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In addition, the analysis in Harris v. Quinn could lead practitioners to
focus on other arguments necessary for overturning Abood.214 For
instance, Abood failed to distinguish the difference between opposition of
union speech in the private-sector and in the public-sector.215 In addition,
Abood failed to distinguish the difficulty of classifying expenditures
between achieving political ends and collective bargaining purposes. 216
Furthermore, the analysis in Abood relies upon an unsupported
assumption stating that the exclusive representation in the public-sector
is dependent on an agency shop system, which is not justified by any
facts.217
Overturning Abood follows the decreasing trend of union
memberships suggesting that a majority of public employees will be
satisfied with the opportunity to choose the option of supporting a
union.218 Compulsory membership dues provide a significant amount of
funding for union expenditures.219 The agency fees alone bring in millions
of dollars for public unions.220 Furthermore, studies suggest that the
aggregate drop in union membership may negatively impact public union

union coffers and resources will be depleted. Id. Without the resources, the unions cannot
process grievances for arbitrations or be able to build a strike fund to protect employees. Id.
This process may lead to union members questioning whether there is any incentive to join
a union, but generally the benefits are enough to keep the current members around. Id.
214
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2632–34 (2014) (describing the concerns with Abood’s
reasoning). One of the arguments is that unions can survive on voluntary, rather than
mandatory, fees. Id. at 2631; Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014).
215
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2632 (stating that there is substantial importance in
distinguishing between public and private-sector bargaining). The political issues involved
with public-sectors are vastly different than the private-sector. Id. These issues are brought
up through the negotiation of benefits, pensions, and wages that are not driven in the private
sector. Id.
216
See id. at 2632–33 (establishing that collective bargaining concerns lobbying, political
advocacy, and the union’s dealings with the employers). However, in the public sector,
political advocacy, collective bargaining, and lobbying are geared towards the government.
Id.
217
See Harris, 134 S. Ct. at 2634 (acknowledging that exclusive representation is not
dependent on an agency shop or union). The reliance on an unsupported empirical
assumption is one of the main reasons why Abood should no longer be the standard. Id.
218
See McHenry, supra note 96, at 601 (stating that the employee trend is to forgo union
protection). Employees are already protected by federal laws and may not feel the desire to
seek union protection. Id. In addition, many employers have become more sophisticated
and aggressive in resisting unionization. Id.
219
See Kersey, supra note 92 (recognizing that millions of dollars go to unions every year
from agency fees). The problem with this system is that unions want the state government
to be more expensive to have more money for political funding. Id.
220
See Gantert, supra note 93 (explaining the correlation between a right to work state’s
economy as growing and vibrant and the non-right to work state’s economy as aging and
stagnant).
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treasuries.221 However, history shows that union memberships decreased
from the mid-1950s to current day and most likely will continue to
decrease.222
The ruling in Harris will benefit many Americans by protecting the
freedom of association of all non-members of unions.223 Personal
assistants and subsidy recipients in Illinois will no longer have to support
union representation through mandatory dues in opposition of their
views.224 Other groups have already sought help since the decision was
rendered.225 In addition, states suspended unions from collecting agency
fees from personal assistants. 226 The National Right to Work Legal
Defense Foundation will be the organization that enforces the states to
comply with the Supreme Court ruling.227
By failing to completely overturn Abood, the United States Supreme
Court leaves the question open for future judicial intervention. 228 While
some people may argue the best remedy is for the case law to develop,
full-fledged public employees will continue to have their freedom of
association infringed if the courts do not address the issue immediately.229
See Greenhouse, supra note 95 (discussing the effect on the unions’ treasuries and
memberships). The drop in union memberships will protect the nation’s families from the
union influence. Id.
222
See Becker, supra note 94, at 1644 (describing that the public sector density rose over
time). The union density decreased in Wisconsin from forty percent in 1959 to seven percent
in 2011 when Governor Walker gutted the public-sector bargaining law. Id.
223
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (reiterating that many Americans will benefit from
Harris because the holding is a win for First Amendment rights). Other family-care providers
in Washington challenged the union’s capability of charging agency fees to full-fledged
public employees. See Brunner, supra note 113 (acknowledging that the purpose of the
lawsuit is to build upon the Harris decision).
224
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 219 (believing that Illinois’ personal assistants will be free
from government compulsion with regards to agency fees).
225
See id. at 220 (supporting the implementation of agency fees through evidence of
employees using Harris to move around the forced unionization from Governor
Blagojevich’s order). The Freedom Foundation challenged the SEIU to force the union to
stop deducting fees from the non-members paychecks. See Brunner, supra note 113 (seeking
to build this lawsuit on the Harris decision to give all public employees the option to opt out
of agency fees).
226
See Huebert, supra note 96, at 220 (demonstrating that Connecticut suspended the
agency fee system for personal assistants).
227
See id. (“If any state doesn’t comply, the National Right to Work Legal Defense
Foundation and others will no doubt be ready to go to court to make sure they do—until no
one is forced to give money to a union simply because he or she receives a government
subsidy.”).
228
See Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618, 2644 (2014) (holding that unions cannot compel
agency fees from quasi-public employees, but leaving the option for all public employees
open for future congressional or judicial intervention).
229
See infra Part IV.B (addressing the concern of needing congressional intervention to
solve the agency fee issue).
221
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In addition, there is no telling who the next Supreme Court Justice will be
after the death of Justice Scalia, which makes an amendment to the
Employees’ Rights statute even more necessary after the recent split fourto-four decision in Friedrichs v. California Teachers Association that
addressed overruling Abood. 230 Due to the uncertainty of the time period,
Congress is in the best position to settle the issue by amending a statute.231
IV. CONTRIBUTION
Although the Employees’ Rights statute gives employees many rights
with regard to labor organizations, more rights still need to be introduced
to protect the right of freedom of association and give the employees the
opportunity to opt out of agency fees.232 Amending the statute to give
employees the right to refuse agency fees is an effective way of protecting
their freedom of association because it eliminates the unions’ use of
subsidized speech.233 This contribution is based on the employee raising
his statutory right before the Supreme Court renders a decision with nine
Justices.
Congress is in the best position to protect all public employees from
unions subsidizing their speech.234 The ability to hear the respective
arguments from all sides of the issue—unions, public employees,
employers, and lobbying groups—will provide the best input and
establish a rule that best fits the public employees’ interest. 235 The
inconsistent cases dealing with the issue of public employees’ protection
against subsidized speech makes action through the legislature important
for the parties, attorneys, judges, and unions involved. 236 Therefore,
Congress is in the best position to provide statutory relief to public

See No. 14-915, 2016 WL 1191684, at *1 (Mar. 29, 2016) (affirming the judgment of the
Court by a split decision); infra Part IV.B (recognizing that congressional intervention is the
best way to move forward with a solution).
231
See infra Part IV.A (amending the Employees’ Rights statute to include all public
employees and the ability to opt out of paying agency fees).
232
See supra Part III.A (discussing the importance of protecting public employees’ freedom
of association); see also infra Part IV.B (arguing that employees’ right to freedom of association
is negatively impacted each day the Court or legislature delays action).
233
See supra Part I (posing a hypothetical scenario where the plaintiff is confronted with
the issue of subsidized speech, but with no remedy against payment of the agency fee).
234
See supra Part II.B–D (recognizing the evolution of court decisions concerning agency
fees, freedom of association, and the progression from Abood).
235
See supra Part III.D (acknowledging the necessity to provide statutory protections for
public employees’ freedom of association).
236
See supra Part II.B–D (describing the inconsistency and evolution between the cases that
lead up to the Harris decision).
230
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employees by amending the Employees’ Rights statute to enable public
employees to refuse agency fees.237
The remainder of Part IV focuses on amending the Employees’ Rights
statute by adding a sub-section for Congress.238 The language in the
proposed section will ensure that public employees, employers, unions,
and judges have proper guidance when confronted with future issues
involving public employees and agency fees.239
A. Proposed Amendment to the Employees’ Rights Statute Section 7102
Congress should amend Section 7102 to include the following
proposed language:
Each public employee shall have the right to form, join, or
assist any labor organization, or to refrain from any such
activity, freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and
each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such
right. Except as otherwise provided under this chapter,
such right includes the right—
(1) to act for a labor organization in the capacity of a
representative and the right, in that capacity, to present
the views of the labor organization to heads of agencies
and other officials of the executive branch of the
Government, the Congress, or other appropriate
authorities, and
(2) to engage in collective bargaining with respect to
conditions of employment through representatives
chosen by employees under this chapter, and
(3) to refuse payment of any compelled membership due or
agency fee imposed by a union while still receiving a reduced
form of union benefits. Any and all claims against employees
for refusal to pay agency fees must be brought before the
National Labor Relations Board within thirty (30) days of the
alleged breach.240

See infra Part IV.A (providing a proposed section to the statute that will allow public
employees to opt out of the mandatory agency fees imposed by unions).
238
See infra Part IV.A (explaining the new statutory language to add to the Employees’
Rights statute to alleviate the inconsistencies among court cases addressing the issue of
agency fees); see also infra Part IV.B (discussing the placement, reasoning, and arguments
over the proposed section).
239
See infra Part IV.B (discussing the advantages of having the right of public employees
to refuse agency fees as the new standard).
240
The regular portion of the text comes from 5 U.S.C. § 7102. The italicized portion of the
237
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B. Commentary
Congress should insert the amended section between 5 U.S.C. § 7102,
discussing the employees’ rights to assist, join, or form any labor
organization, and 5 U.S.C. § 7103, discussing the definitions for the terms
used throughout the chapter.241 This placement is the most appropriate
because this section will distinguish the right of the public employers from
private employers with the right to refuse agency fees.242 In addition, this
section will lead into Section 7103 that provides definitions.243
The proposed amendment applies to all public employees, rather than
just employees that work in the private sector, to combat the usage of
agency fees used for political purposes. 244 Public employees refer to all
people employed by the government, including, but not limited to, police
officers, teachers, and public health care workers.245 Subsection 3 permits
public employees to opt out of the mandatory dues imposed on non-union
members for those people who do not want to join. 246 The final section is
crafted to prevent unreasonable delays from the parties involved and to
help resolve congestion within the court system. 247 The proposed section
is the best solution because of the clear direction and guidance to the
attorneys, judges, and parties involved.248 In addition, the proposed
section eliminates the uncertainty in waiting for another case with the
necessary facts to appear before the Court that could take years to
establish. Furthermore, implementing this section will clear up the
inconsistencies in the Court’s decision concerning subsidized speech of
public employees.249
Critics may argue that employees can always quit and go find work
somewhere else.250 This theory ignores the fact that there may be no other
text represents the additions made by the author.
241
The reasoning for the suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution
of the author.
242
The suggested placement of the proposed section is the contribution of the author.
243
The proposed section’s placement is the contribution of the author.
244
See supra Part IV.A (providing the proposed section to the Employees’ Rights statute).
245
See supra Part IV.A (“Each public employee shall have the right to form, join, or assist
any labor organization, or to refrain from any such activity, freely and without fear of penalty
or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right.”).
246
See supra Part IV.A (“(3) to refuse payment of any compelled membership due or agency fee
imposed by a union while still receiving a reduced form of union benefits.”).
247
See supra Part IV.A (“Any and all claims against employees for refusal to pay agency fees must
be brought before the National Labor Relations Board within 30 days of the alleged breach.”).
248
See supra Part IV.A (establishing a basis for employees to rely upon, rather than hoping
for future court decisions that may never come).
249
See supra Part II (describing the changes and inconsistencies among the Supreme Court
decisions concerning the agency fees).
250
See supra Part II.D (discussing the argument throughout Harris).
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reasonable alternatives for those employees with specialized skills. For
instance, those who are firefighters, teachers, police officers, and tax
professionals would have to undergo expensive and time consuming
training to pursue other professions. The transition from each specialized
job would be unduly burdensome on the public employees. Without
reasonable alternatives, the employees must work as public employees to
maintain their standard of living.
Critics may also argue that agency fees do not support speech and
should still be required to represent all employees within the bargaining
unit.251 Although this may be low on the compelled speech scale, public
employees are still being forced to fund and support an ideology that may
be in opposition of their own views. In addition, unions are only required
to represent all employees in the bargaining unit if it is selected as the
exclusive bargaining agent. However, unions have the authority to be a
members-only bargaining unit.252 This clarification solves the issue of
representing employees who do not want to pay the agency fee.
Opponents may contend that unions will fail without the agency fees
due to a lack funding for resources. There are organizational groups
outside of unions that operate in a similar fashion by advocating on behalf
of the interests of the group members.253 In addition, these organizational
groups have a history of being successful even by depending on voluntary
contributions.254 The evidence suggests that unions, similar to the
organizational groups, could survive off of voluntary contributions and
still function at an adequate level.255 The survival and continued
implementation of unions are important because the argument from the
opposition loses credibility with the unions still successfully functioning
without requiring the mandatory agency fees from all public employees
who are non-members of a union.256
Finally, opponents may contend that this amendment will create an
influx of free riders that may force unions to fail. 257 This ignores the fact
that non-members are required to pay a fee for being non-members; the
non-members do not have full access to the union benefits; and the nonmembers are solely paying the union for the protection. If the union exists
See supra Part II.D (articulating the effect of agency fees among public employees).
See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) (recognizing that unions can
determine to be a members-only organization).
253
See supra Part II.D (reasoning that other organizations exist that advocate for members).
254
See supra Part II.D (acknowledging that other organizations have survived through
voluntary contributions).
255
See supra Part II.D (examining the analogy the court draws in reaching its decision).
256
See supra Part IV (explaining and reasoning through opposing arguments).
257
See supra Part II.D (stating that the free rider argument failed when used for quasipublic employees).
251
252
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for the purpose of protecting employees’ rights and the employees do not
find it necessary, then why should the employees have to pay?
Furthermore, unions have the right to be the exclusive bargaining agent
for an employer. The just compensation for being the exclusive bargaining
agent is paid with the right—not through forcing non-members to pay
agency fees.258 The proposed amendment protects the employees’
freedom of association by giving the employees the right to opt out of
agency fees.259
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court misapplied two cases in its analysis in Abood,
which should be enough to reverse the decision and expand the holding
in Harris to all public employees.260 Congress should recognize that
freedom of association is an important right that needs to be protected
from mandatory dues. Once all public employees have the opportunity
to opt out of mandatory payments, then the money that would normally
go toward union fees can be used in the economy to further the nation’s
economic growth. The public unions will have to find ways to better serve
and promote their services if they wish to keep or improve their
membership numbers. Public employees should no longer be required to
support unions that have shown opposite beliefs through payment of the
agency fee. Tim would not be required to pay the agency fee with this
proposed statutory amendment. He would be free to opt out if the union
supports views in opposition of his own. Congress should change the
requirements of mandatory dues to voluntary dues, thus giving more
power to the individuals that make up the public workforce by protecting
their freedom to speak without reprimand, to advocate for any
organization, and to associate with any organization of their choosing.
Ryan Sullivan*

See Zoeller v. Sweeney, 19 N.E.3d 749, 753 (Ind. 2014) (stating that just compensation is
through the right to represent public employees).
259
See supra note 240 and accompanying text (detailing the proposed changes to the
Employees’ Rights statute).
260
See supra Part III.B (analyzing Abood’s error in its analysis in relying upon Hanson and
Street).
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